HANDBOOK

CSDP

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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HANDBOOK ON CSDP
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Imprint:

Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

Editors: Jochen Rehrl, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth

Layout: Axel Scala, Armed Forces Printing Shop, Vienna

Published by: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria


Charts/Graphs: Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, Gustav Lindstrom, Ernst Schmid, Johann Frank, Silviu Costache, Jochen Rehrl

Printed and bound by:
Armed Forces Printing Shop,
Vienna/Austria, 2010
BMLVS R 10-0439

ISBN: 978-3-902275-31-8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The development of CFSP and CSDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>European Integration: post World War II to CSDP</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Background and Development of the ESS in 2003</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Main Themes of the ESS and Key Message for CSDP</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Excursion: ESS: An Emerging System of Concepts and Sub-strategies –</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An Academic View</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CFSP/CSDP-related aspects of the Lisbon Treaty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Novelties of CFSP/CSDP</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Excursion: Permanent Structured Cooperation – An Academic View</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>External Action of the European Union – Roles and Responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>European Council and its President</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Overview of the main Council Bodies</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Role of the European Commission</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Role of the European Parliament</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Supporting Structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Internal Crisis Management Structures</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Agencies in the field of CSDP</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The EU as an active player</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>CSDP Mission Spectrum – from Petersberg to Lisbon</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Decision Making in the Field of CSDP</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Command and Control Options</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Civilian Missions and Military Operations</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Financing of CSDP Actions</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Capability Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>The rationale for European Capability Development</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Development of Civilian Capabilities</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Development of Military Capabilities</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-ordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-ordination – A Specific Requirement of the EU</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other important CSDP-related aspects

9.1 Co-operation with Third States and International Organisations ............................................. 80
9.2 Training and Education in the Field of CSDP .............................................................................. 82
9.3 Human Rights and Gender Aspects .......................................................................................... 87
9.4 Security Sector Reform ............................................................................................................. 88

Information policy in the field of CSDP

10.1 Communicating EU Common Security and Defence Policy – An Overview ............................. 92

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Course on CSDP – Illustrative Course Programme .......................................................... 98
Annex 4: Lisbon Treaty – CSDP-related articles (extract) ................................................................. 131
Annex 5: ESDP@10: “What lessons for the future?” ........................................................................ 139
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>ACEH Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSET</td>
<td>Association for Security Sector Education and Training</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEUMC</td>
<td>Chairperson of the EUMC</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-ordination</td>
</tr>
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<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Permanent Representatives Committee (Abbreviation in French)</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy (formerly ESDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP HLC</td>
<td>CSDP High Level Course</td>
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<td>CSDP OC</td>
<td>CSDP Orientation Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGEUMS</td>
<td>Director General of the EU Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department for Peace-Keeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Armament Co-operation Strategy</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDC EAB</td>
<td>ESDC Executive Academic Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDC SC</td>
<td>ESDC Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU ISS</td>
<td>EU Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU MS</td>
<td>EU Member State(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSC</td>
<td>EU Satellite Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU SITCEN</td>
<td>EU Situation Centre</td>
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<td>EU SSR</td>
<td>EU Security Sector Reform (Mission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Force (Mission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUJUST</td>
<td>European Justice Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Rule of Law (Mission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMCWG</td>
<td>EUMC Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Police (Mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>General Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDL</td>
<td>Internet-based Distance Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIA</td>
<td>Inter-Institutional Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTEL</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSAT</td>
<td>International Security Sector Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Politico-Military Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pMS</td>
<td>Participating Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Press and Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;T</td>
<td>Research and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Special Committee (Athena)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN(O)</td>
<td>United Nations (Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
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</table>
For more than 10 years, the Common Security and Defence Policy has been one of the crucial topics within the European Union, in particular because this policy reflects the ambitions of the Union and its Member States to be more active, more consistent and more capable.

The Union launched its first crisis management mission in 2003. Since then the Union has deployed over 20 civilian and military missions and operations on three continents. From the start of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its comprehensive approach to crisis management.

Training in general is an important aspect of such successful operational engagement and following its comprehensive approach, training in civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is a special requirement for the EU which needs to be met through special training and combined civilian and military participation.

The European Security and Defence College is providing such training at the strategic level with a mixed civil-military participation in all its courses and is so playing a significant role in the implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.

This Handbook on CSDP, made available under the ESDC, mirrors this approach and thus provides a sound documentation for trainers and trainees of the European Security and Defence College and beyond. It is my hope that it will also help to promote a better and comprehensive understanding of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Catherine Ashton  
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
FOREWORD

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU set itself new levels of ambition. New structures and procedures will make it easier for the Union to be more active and to be more coherent. The newly-created post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is at the same time Vice-President of the European Commission, will also facilitate European external action.

The new structures will also give rise to a need to familiarise and train more personnel to enable them to work more efficiently in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy. In my post as Minister of Defence and Sports, I know from personal experience that training and education is of the utmost importance, sometimes even a \textit{sine qua non}, for accomplishing missions successfully. Therefore Austria supported from the beginning the development of the European Security and Defence College in addition to other efforts aimed at enhancing the operability of CFSP/CSDP.

I would like to thank the Secretariat of the European Security and Defence College for the work done so far. I firmly believe that this present handbook will support the Common Security and Defence Policy and the relevant training and will contribute to the further development a common and shared European security culture.

Norbert Darabos
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports
of the Republic of Austria
The first ever training course on ESDP given at EU level was provided in 2003 under the Greek Presidency and its Presidency initiative for a “Common Training”, the “Pilot ESDP Orientation Course”, as it is called. This pioneering course was conducted in the basement of a Commission building in Brussels and provided the basis for further work.

An evolving European Security and Defence Policy and the recognised need for training and education in this field led to the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in 2005 tasked to promote a common European security culture. Since that time, thousands of civilian and military personnel within and outside the European Union have attended ESDP and ESDP-related courses provided by national training institutions, most of them under the umbrella of the ESDC.

The European Security and Defence College developed into a key player in ESDP training. Since 2003, the number and variety of course offers have been extended in line with the ESDP development. In addition to the Orientation Course, a High-Level Course was introduced aimed at personnel working in key positions in the field of ESDP in the capitals and EU institutions. A “Press and Public Information” (PPI) Course was introduced by Austria in close cooperation with the Council Press Service in 2006. Between 2007 and 2009, several other courses were established, including courses on “Capability Development”, “ESDP and Gender”, “Africa and ESDP”, “Security Sector Reform”, “Mission Planning” and “Decision Making Seminars”. Additionally, and in support of the various courses, an Internet-based Distance Learning (IDL) System was set up, strongly supported by Belgium and Romania.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, ESDP changed to CSDP. Training will continue to play an important role in its further development. However, the lack of proper training material on CSDP has been raised as a major concern by trainers and by course participants who wished to have general documentation on CSDP to which they could refer.

The development of CSDP-related training material is a specific task given to the ESDC but due to the lack of resources, it has not yet been possible to implement it. Austria, a strong supporter of the European Security and Defence College, volunteered to draw up the present “CSDP Handbook” in close cooperation with the ESDC Secretariat.

We, the editors, did not want to duplicate efforts which were already made, for example in the form of the “Guide to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)” developed by the French delegation in Brussels. Nor is this handbook intended to duplicate the academic work of the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris or the publications of the Council Press Service. All these publications have been of particular help in the development of CSDP and related training.

The main aim of this handbook is twofold: firstly, it will serve as a reference book for the course participants after they have attended courses at the ESDC; secondly, it serves as a first guide for trainers at national institutes in their preparations for CSDP-related courses.
Without their help, assistance and contributions, this book would not have been possible. We know the difficulties and challenges in times of change and therefore we very much appreciated any support that was given.

Thanks to all colleagues in the EU who assisted, directly or indirectly, with the compilation of this book. In particular, we would like to thank Ernst Schmid (Austrian Military Representation, Brussels), Sven Bispoc (Egmont Institute, Brussels), Gustav Lindstrom (Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva), Johann Frank (Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports, Vienna), Silviu Costache (EU Military Staff, Brussels), Nicolas Kerleroux and Céline Ruiz (both Council Press Service, Brussels).

We would also like to thank the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports, in particular the Security Policy Director Major-General Johann Pucher, who supported this project from the beginning. And, last but not least, many thanks to Dirk Dubois and Dan Trifanescu from the ESDC Secretariat, who helped to make this book possible.

Vienna/Brussels, in April 2010

In line with this, the table of contents of this book largely reflects the CSDP Standard Curriculum for a CSDP Orientation Course, supplemented with elements of other types of training activity under the umbrella of the ESDC.

Dr. Jochen Rehrl is the Austrian representative in the Steering Committee of the European Security and Defence College and Head of Unit for Defence Policy in the Directorate for Security Policy in the federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria.

Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, member of the Policy Unit of the HR, is acting Head of the ESDC Secretariat currently located in the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.
1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CFSP AND CSDP
The origins of the security and defence architecture of Europe can be found in the post-World War II situation. Starting in the late 1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for increased cooperation across Europe. Examples include the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) – sowing the seeds for a Western European Union – and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 1951 which placed strategic resources under a supranational authority.

In the late 1960s, the European Community (EC) began to explore ways in which to harmonise members’ foreign policies. At the Hague Summit held in December 1969, European leaders instructed their respective foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain. In response, foreign ministers introduced the idea of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the Davignon Report from October 1970. The report defined its objectives (harmonization of positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions) and its procedures (six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, quarterly meetings of the Political Directors forming the Political Committee). Overall, EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC Member States.

European Political Cooperation served as the foundation for the Common Foreign and Security Policy introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. With its entry into force on 1 November 1993, it created a single institutional framework (the European Union) based on three pillars – the second of which was labelled Common Foreign and Security Policy. CFSP is more far-reaching than European Political Coopera-
addition, the Lisbon Treaty established the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The post merges the two positions of High Representative for CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between 1999-2009) and of Commissioner for External Relations (held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner between 2004 and early 2010) and symbolizes the disappearance of the pillar structure.

The Lisbon Treaty formally endorses the extension of the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, that now include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation’ (art.28B/Article 43 (1) TEU). These tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by ‘supporting third states in combating terrorism in their territories’. Finally, political and military solidarity among EU Member States is in the Treaty via the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause (art.28A7/Article 42 (7) TEU), and a ‘solidarity clause’ (Title VII, art.188R1/Article 222 TFEU).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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</table>
| 1954 | Failure of the European Defence Community  
Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU |
| 1957 | Signing of the Treaties of Rome |
| 1969 | The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation |
| 1997 | Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999) |
| 1998 | Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (St. Malo) |
| 1999 | Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for ESDP |
| 2000 | Santa Maria da Feira European Council |
| 2003 | Adoption of the European Security Strategy  
Adoption of the Berlin-Plus Arrangements |
| 2009 | Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – ESDP becomes CSDP |
2 EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
2.1 BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESS IN 2003

STRATEGIC DIVISIONS

When ESDP (now CSDP) was created in the wake of the 1998 Franco-British meeting in St-Malo, there was strong agreement on the need to tackle the military means, but there consensus ended. Member States differed widely on the political-strategic dimension, a debate which goes far beyond CSDP, beyond the CFSP even, but which concerns the whole of EU external action, across the pillars. What should be the scope of the EU’s foreign and security policy ambitions? What degree of autonomy should the EU have? And what then should be the precise role of the military instrument in EU external action? In order not to lose the momentum, it was decided to push through with those elements on which an agreement existed, i.e. the means and institutions of CSDP, assuming that once these were in place the strategic debate would inevitably have to follow. Accordingly, following the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, where the ‘Headline Goal’ was defined, the EU started building military and civilian capabilities for crisis management, without possessing an overall strategic framework for its external action.

That is not to say that EU external action has been completely ad hoc. Over the years, a distinctive European approach to security has emerged, which can be characterised as integrated, multidimensional or comprehensive. Yet the implicit assumptions on which it was based needed to be substantiated and policy areas needed to be integrated in order to arrive at a framework for maximally consistent, coherent and effective external action. For when the EU is confronted with acute crises, such as the one in Iraq in 2003, these implicit assumptions have proved to be insufficient to arrive at a common policy. More often than not, the EU has failed to achieve consensus on how to respond to such crises, even when the instruments and means to do so were at hand. A clear-cut strategy should be able to avoid internal divides and ensure the EU’s participation in international decision-making.

2003: A FAVOURABLE CONTEXT

It seems as if the intra-European crisis over Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a breakthrough possible. On the one hand, the Member States supporting the invasion wanted to demonstrate that the EU does care about the security threats perceived by the US and that the transatlantic alliance is viable still. Hence the similarity between the threat assessment in the ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS), which must be seen as a political message to Washington, and the strong emphasis in the ESS on transatlantic partnership. On the other hand, the Member States opposing the invasion were equally eager to show that even though the threat assessment is to a large degree shared with the US – if not perhaps the perception of the intensity of the threat – there are other options available to deal with these threats. The context of mid-2003 partially also favoured the adoption of the ESS: the successful conclusion of the European Convention and the grand and – then still – promising undertaking to draw up a Constitutional Treaty created a climate in which the preparation of a strategy seemed more feasible than before. The summer of 2003 also witnessed the first EU military operation without the use of NATO assets and outside Europe: Operation Artemis in the DRC (12 June – 1 September).
THE DRAFTING PROCESS

At the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on 2 and 3 May 2003, High Representative Javier Solana was thus – rather unexpectedly – tasked with producing a draft strategic document. At its meeting in Thessaloniki (19-20 June), the European Council welcomed the document submitted by Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, and charged him with taking the work forward with a view to completing a strategy by its next meeting. The EU then organised three seminars, in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 October) and Stockholm (20 October), bringing together officials from the Member States, the future Member States and the European institutions, as well as experts from the academic world, NGOs and the media. This innovative process allowed the High Representative to collect comments and suggestions from a wide variety of actors and observers, a number of which found their way into the final European Security Strategy, which was duly adopted by the European Council meeting on 12 December 2003. At the same time, drafting by a select group of high-level collaborators of Solana, rather than by committee and involving Member States’ delegations, ensured a concise and very readable document.

The main reason why these partly contradictory motivations led to results is that the EU was able to build on an extensive foreign policy acquis. Many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS were already evident as emerging strategic orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq crisis would suggest a deep division between Member States, the ESS actually builds on a strong consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Indeed, the real intra-European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued e.g. that all Member States agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. As in 1999, the real issue at stake was still the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the US reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet, what then has priority for the EU: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? Besides, it should not be forgotten that on a number of foreign policy issues the EU had already unanimously taken positions contrary to those of the US, e.g. on the ICC, on the Kyoto Protocol and on various trade issues.

Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It can only build on consensus in areas where it existed. On a number of issues it remains particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than that: no real choices are made particularly on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an international actor. This divide remains a fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP. Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of clear choices and thus has certainly strengthened the strategic framework for EU foreign policy.
2.2 MAIN THEMES OF THE ESS AND KEY MESSAGE FOR CSDP

PRINCIPLES OF EU FOREIGN POLICY

From the ESS three main principles can be deduced on which all EU external action is based.

The first is prevention: “This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early”. A permanent strategy of prevention and stabilisation, addressing the root causes of threats and challenges, aims to prevent conflict so that, ideally, coercion and the use of force will not be necessary. Addressing the root causes means to close the gap, both within and between countries, between the haves and the have-nots in terms of access to the core public goods to which the EU feels everybody is entitled: security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social well-being. For this gap generates feelings of frustration and marginalisation on the part of those who are excluded economically or politically, radicalisation and extremism of various kinds, social and economic instability, massive migration flows, and tension and conflicts within and between States. Effective prevention is an enormous challenge, for it means addressing a much wider range of issues, at a much earlier stage, across the globe, because as the ESS says “the first line of defence will often be abroad”.

Closing the gap between haves and have-nots of necessity demands a holistic approach, the second principle, for the range of public goods is comprehensive as such. The security, economic, political and social dimensions are inextricably related – an individual cannot enjoy any one core public good unless he has access to them all – and all are present, in differing degrees, in all threats and challenges. In the ESS: “none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments”. Therefore every foreign policy must simultaneously address all dimensions, making use in an integrated way of all available instruments: “Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda”. This is perhaps the core phrase in the ESS: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”.

Such a holistic approach is best implemented via multilateralism, the third principle: “We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors”. Only in cooperation with others can our objectives be achieved peacefully, only in cooperation with all global actors can global challenges be successfully addressed, and only in cooperation with a wide range of actors can complex issues be comprehensively tackled. “The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective”, declares the ESS under the heading of “effective multilateralism”. Multilateralism is “effective” to the extent that the ensemble of regimes, mechanisms and institutions manages to provide access to the core public goods to citizens worldwide.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CSDP

The ESS constitutes an important strategic choice, but it mostly tells us how to do things – it is much vaguer on what to do, it is incomplete in terms of objectives. Of course, a strategy must be translated into sub-strategies and policies for it to be put into action. With regard to CSDP however, such a “sub-strategy” is missing, hence there is a missing link between the ambition in the ESS – “to share in the responsibility for global security” – and the practice of CSDP operations and capability development. As the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World states, “We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources”. Three dimensions must be covered.

First of all, there is not even consensus about which tasks or types of operations the EU can undertake. Legally, the EU’s Petersberg tasks include operations at the high end of the violence spectrum, including combat operations, yet politically the Member States are still extremely divided over the use of force under the EU flag.

Secondly, priority regions and scenarios must be defined in relation to Europe’s vital interests: where and why should the EU deploy troops and perhaps even go to war? Because of its proximity, “the neighbourhood” logically appears as a clear priority where the EU should not only be active, but take the lead. It could be debated whether the “broader neighbourhood”, including Central Asia and the Gulf, is a priority as well. Next to the neighbourhood, the ESS singles out Iran as a priority. Other conflicts are mentioned in the ESS – Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean Peninsula – but whether the EU should actively contribute to their resolution is not clear at all. Sub-Saharan Africa has been an important area of focus for CSDP, though the strategy behind it has not always been clear. For example, given that the EU twice intervened in the DRC at the request of the UN, in 2003 and 2006, why was the third request, in 2008, refused? This demonstrates that without a strategy, it is impossible to define what the success of an operation means. A perfect example of a European priority is the operation against piracy off the coast of Somalia, securing Europe’s lines of communication with the world. Importantly, the collective security system of the UN, and therefore of the EU as its main supporter and with two permanent members on the Security Council among its ranks, can only be legitimate if it addresses the threats to everyone’s security – too much selectivity undermines the system. The EU must therefore also shoulder its share of the responsibility by playing an active role in the Security Council and by contributing capabilities to UN(-mandated) crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

Finally, the EU must decide what scale of effort to devote to these priorities. CSDP is based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, i.e. 60,000 troops, but this has been overshadowed by the much more limited battle groups. The availability of the forces declared cannot be assessed, because Member States declare numbers that in theory they are willing to deploy for CSDP operation, but no pre-identified units, and have often declared similar numbers to NATO as well. If all ongoing CSDP, NATO, UN and national operations in which EU Member States participate are counted, Europe deploys more than 80,000 troops, but they obviously cannot mobilise 60,000 additional troops for expeditionary operations. The combined armed forces of the EU-27 total 2 million troops. There is no vision about how many of those troops Europe really needs.

These questions should be answered in a military or civil-military sub-strategy, or “white book,” specifically for CSDP. As Member States have but a single set of forces, the question is not what the CSDP level of ambition is and what is that of NATO; the question is what the EU, as the political expression of Europe and as a comprehensive foreign policy actor, wants to contribute as a global security provider, regardless of whether a specific operation is undertaken under CSDP or NATO (or UN) command.
The European Security Strategy – A Summary Overview

**The Security Environment**

**Global Challenges**
- Poverty and bad governance is often at the heart of the problem.
- Global warming.
- Competition for natural resources.
- Energy dependence.
- Security is a precondition of development.

**Key Threats**

- **Terrorism** – willing to use unlimited violence and cause massive casualties – linkage to violent religious fundamentalism. Europe is both target and a base for such terrorists.
- **Proliferation of WMD** is the single most important threat to peace and security. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire WMD.
- **Regional Conflicts** threaten regional stability. Weakened or failed states in many parts of the world – are often exploited by criminal elements and are the basis for organised crime.

Taking these different elements together, we would be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

**Strategic Objectives**

**Countering the Threats**
- The EU already actively tackles threats presented by terrorism, proliferation, failed states, organised crime (most recently the proliferation of WMD).
- With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad.
- There is a need to act before a crisis occurs – conflict and threat prevention cannot start too early!
- None of the new threats can be tackled by military means alone. Each requires a mixture of instruments.

**Building Security in our Neighbourhood**
- Promotion of a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean – close and co-operative relations.
- The credibility of our foreign policy depends on consolidation of our achievements in the Western Balkans.
- Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe but extending the benefits of economic and political co-operation to our future neighbours in the East – stronger interest in the Southern Caucasus is necessary.
- Resolution of Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. Continued engagement with our Mediterranean partners through more effective economic, security and cultural co-operation in the framework of the Barcelona Process.
- And a broader engagement with the Arab world.

**International Order based on Effective Multilateralism**
- Our security/prosperity depends on an effective multilateral system. Stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.
- The fundamental framework for international relations is the UN Charter. Strengthening the United Nations is a European priority. We should be ready to act when rules are broken. One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship – NATO is an expression of this relationship.
- Strengthening global governance – regional organisations are significant. Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reforms!

**Policy Implications for Europe**

**To be more active**
- Development of a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, if necessary, robust intervention.
- Ability to sustain several operations simultaneously.
- Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.

**To be more capable**
- More resources for defence and better use through pooled and shared assets, avoid duplication. Stronger civilian resources and capabilities (combine resources of Member States and EU Institutions).
- EU-NATO arrangements.
- Wider spectrum of missions including inter alia disarmament operations.

**To be more coherent**
- We are stronger when we act together!
- Key: create synergy of EU’s and Member States’ instruments.
- All our policies should follow the same agenda (see Western Balkans).

**Working with Partners**
- Key: International Co-operation!
- Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable! Closer relations with Russia/strategic partnerships! Develop strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India!
2.3 EXCURSION:
ESS: AN EMERGING SYSTEM OF CONCEPTS AND SUB-STRATEGIES – AN ACADEMIC VIEW

European Security Strategy: An emerging system of concepts and sub-strategies

Strategy defined as the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating all necessary instruments to deal with the relevant security challenges must be based on a system of grand strategy and complementing sub-strategies. Although the actual system of “security strategies” of the European Union is not equally precise on all aspects and does not comprise all necessary sub-strategies 1 in a coordinated manner a comprehensive system of concepts, doctrines, policies and strategies is emerging.

The European Security Strategy is the corner-stone document of strategic thinking and planning within the EU. But the ESS in which the European Union clarifies its security strategy which is aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a better world, identifying the threats facing the Union, defining its strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe, is written on a rather abstract level. The “Grand Strategic Chapeau” of the ESS must therefore be complemented by more specific sub-strategies.

The process of complementing the ESS is not a strategic “top-down” project but more an evolving endeavour. Nevertheless it is possible to bring the documents and “sub-strategies” in a logical and systematic order (see diagram 1, next page).

The EU’s sub-strategies include amongst others:
- regional and country specific strategies and policies with a special focus on the European Neighbourhood, the Western Balkans and Africa
- horizontal strategies dealing with proliferation, the nexus of security and development, security implications of climate change or cyber security
- strategies and programmes for safeguarding internal security including the “solidarity clause” which offers the option of using even military assets for internal purposes
- counter-terrorism and combating radicalization and recruitment strategies
- CSDP concepts and processes like the civilian and military headline goal, the Battlegroup concept or the capability development plan.

Most of the above-mentioned documents do not directly deal with external countries but are aimed at coordinating internal policies between the EU Member States.

Linkage of internal and external security policies

The main responsibility for internal security rests with the Member States. But with the “Solidarity clause” the EU has a complementary role in dealing with natural and technical disasters and terrorism.

Internal and external security policies are interlinked: an adequate “homeland security system” within the EU and within the Member States is a precondition for an active external security policy. And, vice versa, against the background of a globalised security landscape, the internal security of the EU can only be safeguarded through a preventive and comprehensive foreign and security policy which deals effectively with external risks. The predominately transnational character of postmodern risks requires a more systematic linking of internal and external security and an effect based employment of the necessary security instruments (see diagram 2, next page).

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1 “Sub-strategy” is not an official term for a specific category of documents, but refers to those documents that deal with certain security domains or elaborate on one aspect of the ESS.
European Security Strategy and important sub-strategies

- Solidarity Clause
- The Hague Programme (10 priorities e.g.: fight against terrorism, migration management, borders and visas, privacy and information security, organised crime)
- Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (issues: human rights, fight against terrorism, DC, migration, good governance)
- European Border Control Agency
- European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Counter Terrorism Strategy
- EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism
- EU Terror Financing Prevention Guidelines
- Conceptual Framework on the ESDP-Dimension of the fight against terrorism
- European Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism
- Non-Proliferation Strategy
- Security and Development
- Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Security Sector Reform
- Climate Change and security
- Cyber Security
- European Neighborhood Policy
- Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
- Various Balkan Strategies and Policies
- EU-Africa Strategy
- Counter Asia Strategy
- Country specific strategies and policies

Linkage of internal and external Security

Diagram 1

Diagram 2
Culture of coordination

The core policy challenge for the EU institutions and the Member States is the effective coordination of policies and instruments within a sound concept of civil military coordination (CMCO). Most of the tools which are necessary to deal with the new security challenges – which require by nature a comprehensive approach – are available within the European Union. But they belong to different levels (Commission, Council Secretariat or Member States).

None of the objectives of the ESS can be achieved without a coordinated approach and the contribution of all relevant sectors of the EU. CSDP does not only have an external crisis management function but might be a helpful toolbox, capability and knowledge provider for other security domains as well.

Drafting of a “White Book on Defence”

Diagram 1 demonstrates that at least one central sub-strategy is missing so far: a clear cut military strategy. The development of a military strategy has been assessed as premature so far. But in the aftermath of the Implementation Report (2008) a careful assessment of the available sub-strategies would be a helpful element in institutionalizing the strategic debate within the EU. Such a process would also make it possible to identify in which areas the ESS has not yet been translated into “sub-strategies” or policies.

One element in this discussion process might be the drafting of a “White Book on Defence” which could comprise:
- a common analysis of the strategic situation, risks and challenges
- a definition of the military level of ambition of the EU derived from common defined European security interests
- strategic guidelines for cooperation with partners
- a definition of the possible role of the military in implementing the solidarity clause
- guidance for the harmonisation of national force planning and capability development including the “permanent structured cooperation” and “pooling and sharing” models
- guidance concerning the military implications of the “comprehensive approach”
- defining the dimension of the military in dealing with non-military threats and in implementing non-military sub-strategies
- cooperation with third countries and partners.
CFSP/CSDP-RELATED ASPECTS OF THE LISBON TREATY
3.1 NOVELTIES OF CFSP/CSDP

The Lisbon Treaty can be described as a milestone in the development of the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) and specifically of the “Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP). In addition to the dual function of the High Representative for CSFP, who is at the same time Vice-President of the Commission, the main CFSP/CSDP-related aspects include:

THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS)

The impact of EU foreign policy will be enhanced by the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which will work for the High Representative. EEAS staff will come from the relevant departments of the European Commission & General Secretariat of the Council and from the Diplomatic Services of EU Member States.

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL (FAC)

The Foreign Affairs Council formulates policy regarding the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensures that the Union’s action is consistent. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, contributes through her proposals towards the preparation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.

The General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) are the only
Council formations which are laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, there is only one Council of the European Union, which can meet in 10 different formations. The Council formations can be extended or limited in numbers by the Heads of State and Government.

THE CSDP TASK CATALOGUE

The CSDP task catalogue includes the Petersberg tasks, namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and crisis-management tasks of combat forces, including peacemaking. And additionally to the Petersberg tasks, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping as well as post-conflict stabilisation tasks. All these tasks should contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

THE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CLAUSE

The mutual assistance clause follows the EU principle of solidarity. It guarantees the EU Member States aid and assistance from all other partners in the event of armed aggression on the territory of a Member State. The assistance is not limited to civilian, military or diplomatic efforts, but must be read as meaning as comprehensive as is necessary (“by all the means in their power”). Nevertheless, the status of neutrals and of non-allied and NATO partners will be respected.

PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION

Permanent Structured Cooperation should help Member States to build up closer links among each other. The preconditions for joining such a Permanent Structured Cooperation are firstly the fulfilment of higher criteria for military capabilities and secondly the more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to undertaking the most demanding missions. In Protocol No 10 to this Treaty, some more application criteria are given:

An EU Member State must
(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capabilities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks...
referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of five to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended to at least 120 days.

**TASKING OF A GROUP OF MEMBER STATES**

The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States, which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task, in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agree among themselves on the management of the task. Nevertheless, Member States participating in the task will keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. They will inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions set for the task. The Council will then decide if further steps are necessary.

**FINANCING**

The principles of financing CSFP/CSDP missions remains unchanged. The administrative expenditure of the institutions arising from the implementation of the CSDP, both for civilian missions and military operations, is charged to the budget of the European Union. The same applies, as a general rule, to operating expenditure except for cases where the Council – acting unanimously – decides otherwise and for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications. If expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it will be generally charged to the Member States in accordance with their gross national product (unless...
the Council unanimously decides otherwise).

The new aspect, which was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, is the creation of a so-called start-up fund. Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43 TEU which are not charged to the Union budget will be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States’ contributions. The Council will then authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The High Representative reports to the Council on the implementation of this remit.

This clause relates to the prevention of terrorist threats, the protection from any terrorist attack and consequence management if such an attack occurs. Additionally, the solidarity clause deals with events such as man-made or natural disasters. In all these above mentioned cases, the Union and its Member States will act jointly in a spirit of solidarity. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.

**SOLIDARITY CLAUSE**
**(NOT DIRECTLY CSDP RELATED)**

The Solidarity Clause is not part of the CSDP chapter of the Treaty on European Union, but is laid down in Art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Although there is no direct link with the CFSP/CSDP, the same capabilities are addressed and it is therefore worth mentioning.
3.2 EXCURSION: PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION – AN ACADEMIC VIEW

The Lisbon Treaty’s Main CSDP-related aspect: Permanent Structured Cooperation

The Objective: More Deployed, More Quickly

The Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence (PSCD) (Art. 1) sets out two objectives, one of which, i.e. to supply or contribute to a battle group, has already been achieved by most Member States. This leaves a single major objective: to proceed more intensively to develop defence capacities, which must of course be available and deployable, as Art. 2 (c) says. The main problem of Europe’s armed forces is fragmentation: limited defence budgets spent on a plethora of small-scale capabilities result in disproportionately high spending on “overheads” (and useless intra-European duplications) and, consequently, less spending on deployable capabilities and actual operations. To overcome this low cost-effectiveness, multinational cooperation is a must. Hence PSCD must be inclusive: the more pMS, the more synergies and effects of scale can be created. Thus, the challenge is to reconcile inclusiveness and ambition, i.e. to translate the Protocol into quantitative criteria that allow all MS to participate but that do entail a real commitment.

Criteria for Participation: Realistic but Real

Criteria for participation must be realistic, i.e. they must be within reach of the majority of MS, and must stimulate pMS to tackle the obstacles to deployability and sustainability, notably by addressing the capability shortfalls identified by the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM). This has 3 implications. Firstly, pMS cannot be expected to fulfil the criteria at the launching of PSCD: criteria must be results-oriented, to be fulfilled by an agreed deadline. Secondly, criteria that are unrealistic, e.g. spending 2 % of GDP on defence, should be avoided. Thirdly, PSCD must not just focus on the input, i.e. the level and manner of spending, but on the desired output, i.e. on specific deployable capabilities. PSCD is a way of achieving the HG2010 in a reasonable timeframe – that is the desired output.

The following criteria can be envisaged – to be seen as one set, to be pursued simultaneously:

- **Criterion 1**: The overall objective of PSCD is that pMS increase their current declared level of ambition in terms of deployability and sustainability by an agreed % by an agreed deadline, e.g. by 25 % in 5 years and by 50 % in 10 years. Thus, if PSCoop is launched in 2010, a pMS which now has the ambition to always have 1000 troops in the field should aim to continually field 1250 by 2015, and 1500 by 2020.

- **Criterion 2**: pMS should harmonise their defence spending. At the very least, pMS spending less than the EU average (at present 1,63 % of GDP) should commit not to further decrease their defence budget, neither in real terms nor in % of GDP.

- **Criterion 3**: pMS will contribute as a ratio of their GDP to the EDA-initiated projects aimed at addressing the shortfalls identified by the CDM.

- **Criterion 4**: In the longer term, e.g. 10 years, pMS strive to reach the EU average in terms of defence spending per military: € 111.198.–

The aim of PSCD is not to punish or exclude MS. Maximum effect requires encouraging all MS to generate more deployable capabilities, by allowing as many as possible to participate at their own level of means, hence this proposal for realistic but real criteria.
PSCD as a Permanent Capability Generation Conference

In order to make sure that pMS, when making policy on the basis of the criteria above, focus on the capabilities that at European level have been commonly identified as vital, inspiration can be found in the method used to launch CSDP operations: a Force Generation Conference. Within PSCD the EDA can organise a “Capability Generation Conference” aimed at remedying each commonly identified shortfall within a reasonable timeframe. This implies that pMS are willing: to revisit their national defence planning, without any taboos; to do away with national capability initiatives proven to be redundant; to pool assets and capabilities in order to generate savings; to contribute to the programmes launched to fill the shortfalls in terms of GDP, as per criterion 3; and to actively contribute to negotiations for as long as it takes to achieve success. This would indeed result in a permanent conference – but also in a permanently relevant EDA.

“End-to-End” Multinational Cooperation: Pooling

The reality is that many MS will not be able to meet the criteria and contribute significant capabilities if they maintain the same range of nationally organised capabilities that they possess today. Therefore, identifying the opportunities for multinational cooperation is essential, in order to allow pMS to maintain relevant capabilities in a cost-effective way. The EDA will have a bird’s eye view: based on the information which in the context of the CDP pMS already provide (and must continually update) about their plans and programmes, and in combination with the progressive results of the Capability Generation Conference, it will be able to identify opportunities for cooperation.

Multinational cooperation does not imply that all pMS in PSCD cooperate in all capability areas. Rather a set of overlapping clusters will emerge, with e.g. pMS 1, 2 and 3 cooperating in area X and pMS 2, 3, 4 and 5 cooperating in area Y. This cooperation can take various forms, from joint procurement or development projects but with the aim of afterwards equipping national formations, to pooling, i.e. the creation of permanent multinational formations. The beauty of PSCD is its flexibility.

The model for pooling can be provided by EATC: deployable national assets, in this case transport aircraft, remain clearly identifiable and manned by national personnel, but are co-located on one base, where all support functions are multinationalised, as are the command and control arrangements. Thus pooling can still offer great flexibility: each pMS has to guarantee that its personnel in the support and command and control structures will be available whenever a pMS deploys its aircraft – but no pMS is obliged to deploy its own actual aircraft each and every time another pMS deploys its aircraft for a specific operation. The same model can be applied to fighter wings or army divisions. Obviously, pooling is easier when pMS use the same equipment, hence smaller pMS especially will inevitably take into account whom they want to cooperate with as a major factor in procurement decisions. For pooling to increase cost-effectiveness, national structures and bases must naturally be cut.
4 EXTERNAL ACTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
4.1 EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND ITS PRESIDENT

The European Council was created in 1974 with the intention of establishing an informal forum for discussion between Heads of State or Government. It rapidly developed into the body which fixed goals for the Union and set the course for achieving them, in all fields of EU activity. It acquired a formal status in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which defined its function as providing the impetus and general political guidelines for the Union’s development.

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, it has become an institution. Its President is Herman Van Rompuy.

The European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. It provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defines its general political directions and priorities.

The European Council does not exercise legislative functions.

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part in its work.

When the agenda so requires, the members of the European Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister and, in the case of the President of the Commission, by a member of the Commission.

The European Council meets twice every six months and is convened by its President. When the situation so requires, the President will convene a special meeting of the European Council.

Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European Council are taken by consensus. In some cases, it adopts decisions by unanimity or by qualified majority, depending on what the Treaty provides for.

The European Council elects its President by a qualified majority. The President’s term of office is two and a half years, renewable once.

The European Council usually meets in Brussels, in the Justus Lipsius building. It is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council.
The Council building “Justus Lipsius”

Meeting Room in the Justus Lipsius building
At the informal meeting in Brussels on 19 November, ahead of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December, EU Heads of State or Government agreed on the appointment of Ms Catherine Ashton as the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

**DUTIES OF THE HR**

The HR exercises, in foreign affairs, the functions which, have hitherto been performed by the six-monthly rotating Presidency, the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations.

In accordance with Articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty on the European Union, the High Representative:

- conducts the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
- contributes by her proposals to the development of that policy, which she will carry out as mandated by the Council, and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted in this field;
- presides over the Foreign Affairs Council;
- is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. She ensures the consistency of the Union’s external action. She is responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action.
- represents the Union in matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and expresses the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences.
- exercises authority over the European External Action Service (EEAS) and over the Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations.

**SUPPORTING ARRANGEMENTS**

In fulfilling her mandate, the HR is assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS). She also benefits from support from the Council and Commission services as appropriate.
4.3 EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE

GENERAL

Article 27(3) TEU constitutes the legal basis for the Council decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. “In fulfilling his mandate, the HR shall be assisted by a EEAS. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States …”

TASKS OF THE EEAS

The EEAS will help the HR to ensure the consistency and coordination of the Union’s external action and prepare policy proposals and implement them after their approval by Council. It will also assist the President of the European Council and the President as well as the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations and will ensure close cooperation with the Member States.

The EEAS should be composed of single geographical (covering all regions and countries) and thematic desks, which will continue to perform under the authority of the HR the tasks currently executed by the relevant parts of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Trade and development policy as defined by the Treaty should remain the responsibility of the relevant Commissioners.

ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS

The EEAS should have an organisational status reflecting and supporting its unique role and functions in the EU system. The EEAS should be a service sui generis separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It should have autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff.

EEAS staff will be appointed by the HR and drawn from three sources: relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council, of the Commission and of national diplomatic services of the Member States.

A balanced representation between the different categories must be ensured. When the EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from Member States should represent at least one third of EEAS staff (AD level), including diplomatic staff in delegations. In addition, some supporting staff should also come from Member States. Staff from Member States should be present in the EEAS from the outset, including in senior positions in Brussels and EU delegations.

The Commission’s delegations will become Union delegations under the authority of the HR and will be part of the EEAS structure. They will work in close cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States. They should play a supporting role as regards diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries.

In order to enable the High Representative to conduct the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Staff (EUMS) should be part of the EEAS while
taking full account of the specificities of these structures and preserving their particular functions, procedures and staffing conditions. The Situation Centre (SitCen) should be part of the EEAS, while putting in place the necessary arrangements to continue to provide other relevant services to the European Council, Council and the Commission.

Effective consultation procedures should be established between the EEAS and the services of the Commission with external responsibilities, including those in charge of internal policies with significant external dimensions.

The EU Special Representatives (EUSR) or their tasks should be integrated into the EEAS.

The High Representative should regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP/CSDP. Close contacts with the European Parliament will take place at working level. The EEAS should therefore contain functions responsible for relations with the European Parliament.

There will be several stages before the shape of the EEAS is finalised. The Council will be fully involved throughout the whole process.

- A first stage from the entry into force of the Treaty to the adoption of the Council Decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. The HR should submit his/her proposal with a view to it being adopted at the latest by the end of April 2010.
- A second stage for setting up the EEAS, from the adoption of the Council Decision to full cruising speed. A first status report should be made in 2012.
- When the EEAS has been functioning for some time at full speed, there should be a review of the functioning and organisation of the EEAS followed, if necessary, by a revision of the decision. This review should also cover the scope of the EEAS, including delegations’ role in consular affairs. Such a review should take place in 2014.

**4.4 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN COUNCIL BODIES**

CSDP structures are under the authority of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. They differ from structures supporting other European policies because of the requirement for unanimity of decision-making at all levels.

The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Political and Security Committee prepare the work of the Council, with COREPER preparing the work of the Council as a whole and the PSC dealing with political and security issues.

Sources for more and updated information

For more information and updated information you can consult two different homepages:
The **Political and Security Committee (PSC)** is the linchpin of CFSP and CSDP. It meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP including CSDP). It prepares a consistent EU response to a crisis and exercises its “political control and strategic direction” in times of crisis.

The **European Military Committee (EUMC)** is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chief of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent Military Representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. The EUMC is supported by the EU Military Staff.

In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised by the **Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)**. This committee provides information, recommendations, and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.

The **Politico-Military Group (PMG)** is responsible for the politico-military aspects of the CSDP. Similar to the CIVCOM, it formulates recommendations and advice for the PSC on the politico-military aspects of crisis management.

Another group, not mentioned in the diagram, is the **Working Group of Foreign Relations Counsellors (Relex Group)**. This group deals with all horizontal aspects in particular the institutional, legal and budgetary issues. It prepares e.g. the Council Joint Actions required for the launching of the EU’s crisis management missions and operations. It also monitors the ATHENA mechanism (funding of military operations).
4.5 ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The Commission is fully associated with CFSP and it has the right to put forward initiatives on any question relating to CFSP. It participates in decision-shaping, including at the Political and Security Committee which is the linchpin of CFSP. And it is always present in political dialogue meetings with third countries.

Crisis management lies at the heart of the CFSP. The Common Security and Defence Policy which is an integral part of CFSP, was given a range of crisis management functions (known as the “Petersberg tasks”) under the Amsterdam Treaty. They include *inter alia* humanitarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping, and combat operations in crisis management, including peace-making. Some of these are clearly military, and here the Commission has no role, except to ensure that civilian activities which follow on a military crisis operation proceed smoothly and coherently.

At the Feira European Council in 2000, a number of civilian crisis management tasks were also attributed to ESDP. Since then, there is often no clear distinction between purely civilian ESDP “crisis management” operations and activities which the Commission has been carrying out, in some cases for years, as part of development policy or humanitarian aid. This is the case, for e.g., operations to reinforce the rule of law such as those the Council has carried out in Georgia.

Furthermore, a whole range of topics which come up in CFSP directly affect Community policies. These include terrorism, sanctions policy, human rights and democracy. The Commission has specific tasks in all these areas, and in some it has its own instruments – including a whole range of micro and mini-projects in the context of the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights, and electoral assistance, observation and monitoring.

The Commission’s important role is to manage the CFSP budget line. The Community budget cannot be used to finance EU military operations. But the money earmarked for CFSP within the Community budget is allocated *inter alia* to the financing of civilian crisis management missions and it can thus provide indirectly useful support to these operations. This is possible in particular under the budget mechanism of the Instrument for Stability, used especially to provide support for CSDP missions and operations.

We have learned the lesson that military means do not suffice to get a society on its feet again. A long-term political solution for a region in crisis needs a long-term political, financial and administrative commitment which normally has wider implications for the EU’s future relationships. In these situations, the Commission can make a huge contribution to a successful CFSP and CSDP. Moreover, the lion’s share of the civilian work after a conflict – and during it – will often be done by the Community.
4.6 ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

GENERAL

The European Parliament developed a strong consensus in support of the European Security and Defence Policy (as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) during the 6th legislative term (2004 to 2009). This consensus can be seen in the adoption of several Resolutions on CFSP and in Resolutions approving specific ESDP Operations (incl. EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, and EUFOR Chad). Already at the start of the 7th legislative term (2009 to 2014), the European Parliament has shown its determination to use its new Lisbon Treaty powers to assert its parliamentary prerogative over the development of both CFSP and the new Common Security and Defence Policy. This is particularly evident in the role of the European Parliament in holding a hearing for the Vice-President, who is also the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and in giving its approval of the VP/HR in a vote on the whole of the Commission. Furthermore, the European Parliament is preparing its consultation with the VP/HR (through the adoption of a Resolution) on the European External Action Service as well as having to agree jointly with the Council amendments to legislation (on staffing and financing) and the Union’s budget in order for the EEAS to become operational.

1 This is clearly stated in the recent adoption of the report by the Chair of AFET, Mr Albertini, “on the Annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 2008, presented to the European Parliament in application of Part II, Section G, paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 (2009/2057(INI))”. See also the Report by the Chair of SEDE, Mr Danjean on “the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and the CSDP (2009/2198(INI))”.

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE AREA OF CFSP/ CSDP – POLICY-SHAPING NOT POLICY-MAKING

The formal role of the European Parliament in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (and, as an integral part of that policy, the Common Security and Defence Policy) stems from its two main roles as stipulated in the Treaties i.e. that of political scrutiny and budgetary authority.

From the moment the European Parliament endorsed the High Representative as Vice-President of the Commission, the development of a close working relationship between the HR/VP and the European Parliament has become the focus of attention. Initially this centred on the setting up of the EEAS, which was established by a European Council Decision following consultation with the EP and the consent of
the Commission (Article 27.3). The VP/HR has a central role (reaching across the EU institutions and to the Member States) in ensuring the consistent and effective formulation of EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. In this respect the Lisbon Treaty tasks the HR/VP to work with the European Parliament (Article 36 of the Lisbon Treaty), whereby:

"The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. She shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security policy."

Therefore the VP/HR Catherine Ashton is the new "linchpin" of EU external action and importantly her role in relation to the EP is clearly spelt out as one of informing, consulting and of ensuring the views of the EP are duly taken into consideration.

**REINFORCING PARLIAMENT’S PREROGATIVE: THE POWER OF THE PURSE**

Although these consultative rights do not give the EP a decision-making role in the CFSP/CSDP, they are supplemented by the European Parliament role as a budgetary authority. Under the Nice Treaty the (rotating) EU Presidency took the lead on CFSP/ESDP and was responsible for consulting the European Parliament. As the number of civilian ESDP missions grew (military missions are funded by MS outside the EU budget) from 2004 this made a greater demand on the Union’s CFSP budget (growing from approx. 35 million euros prior to 2004 to approx 280 million in 2010). The Presidency therefore had to approach the European Parliament as a budgetary authority and regularly request increases in the CFSP budget. As part of the negotiations on the macro financial budget (i.e. the budget for all Community policy areas) an "Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management" was adopted on 17 May 2006. This agreement specified that for the CFSP budget (predominantly used for contributing to civilian ESDP missions) the Presidency represented by the Chair of the Political and Security Committee should consult the EP (Foreign Affairs and Budget Committees) at least five times a year in order to prepare for the adoption of the annual CFSP budget. These "Joint Consultation Meetings" have been an important forum for the EP to discuss AFET and SEDE’s views on ESDP missions alongside the Budget Committees oversight of CFSP spending. The meetings symbolise the coming together of Parliament’s consultation/scrutiny role and budgetary authority in the area of
CFSP. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and specifically the replacement of the rotating Presidency by the VP/HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, this IIA will need to be amended to reflect the new role of the VP/HR in relation to the European Parliament.

In addition, in order to ensure more flexible use of the CFSP budget the Lisbon Treaty (Article 41.3 TEU) includes the provision for a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the area of CFSP. The Article states that this Decision will be taken “after consulting the European Parliament”.

**STRENGTHENING THE PARLIAMENTARY LEGITIMACY OF CFSP/CSDP: COOPERATION WITH NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS**

Another important innovation in the Lisbon Treaty can be found in the role of National Parliaments and in particular in Protocol Number 1 (in particular Articles 9 and 10) of the Treaty which specifies that:

> The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall determine the organisation and promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union.” This could include “… the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees … interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of the common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy.”

The EP already invites national Parliaments for an annual exchange on the CFSP (including ESDP). Significantlhy, through the political groups, it also reaches national delegations and their Parliaments and Parliamentary Parties (some Members of the Parliament even have voting rights in national political parties). This is important in bridging what is referred to as the double democratic deficit, whereby the EP has weak decision-making powers but very good insight (and increasingly a policy-shaping role) on CSDP but where national Parliaments have stronger formal powers but struggle to understand the complexities of EU decision making on CFSP (and CSDP). Working together the European Parliament and national Parliaments can play an important role in giving CSDP democratic legitimacy.

**CONCLUSION**

The innovations in the Lisbon Treaty provide an opportunity to improve political consistency in the EU’s external representation and action. The key role of the VP/HR, supported by the EEAS, is central in achieving the objectives of the Union. The political framework for consultation and dialogue with the European Parliament continue to improve enabling it to play a full role in the development of CFSP/CSDP. As a partner in the development of the Union’s external relations, the Lisbon Treaty enables the European Parliament to play its role in helping to address the challenge clearly set out in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy which states that:

> Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.”
5 SUPPORTING STRUCTURES
From the start of CSDP, the EU quickly developed its crisis management structures to present its ability to deploy civilian and military crisis management instruments as its specific strength. The relevant internal services supporting the crisis management include in particular the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the Situation Centre, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the Military Staff. The EU is a ‘living organisation’ and CSDP a process developed step by step. The EU’s crisis management structures mirror this process and will therefore further evolve in the future. The structures presented in this chapter are currently part of the General Secretariat of the Council and will be transferred to the External Action Service when it is fully established.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING DIRECTORATE (CMPD)

The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) was created in November 2009 merging the former directorates dealing with defence issues and civilian aspects of crisis management and the civ-mil cell of the EU Military Staff. The directorate is headed by a Deputy Director-General.

The CMPD is responsible for the politico-strategic level planning of CSDP civilian and military missions, and also for supporting the various aspects of CSDP development. It represents an integrated capability, seeking to develop and exploit the synergies between the civilian and military elements of CSDP as part of the comprehensive approach to crisis management.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING DIRECTORATE CMPD

TRANSITION STRUCTURE

(Feb 2010)
The planning function covers the strategic planning of missions from the advanced and contingency stage through to the production of the crisis management concept, and also the subsequent strategic oversight of missions as appropriate. This is undertaken by integrated planning teams composed of civilian and military planners, and including judicial, police, rule of law, gender and human rights experts. The CSDP development function covers a wide range of areas and is spread across 2 units. It includes both military and civilian aspects of capabilities, partnerships with other crisis management actors, including NATO, UN, AU and 3rd States, and finally exercises, training, concepts, lessons learned. CMPD also provides support to Council bodies on CSDP-related issues. The CMPD is currently part of the General Secretariat of the Council and will be transferred to the European External Action Service (EEAS) when it is established.

EU SITUATION CENTRE (EU SITCEN)

The EU needs timely intelligence to make wise policy decisions in order to maintain “a secure Europe in a better world” (ESS). The EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN) is providing early warning, situational awareness and intelligence analysis to assist policy development in the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Counter Terrorism. The SITCEN contributes to the work of the General Secretariat by:

- providing all-source assessment on CFSP issues and assessment of the terrorist threat to the Union and its Member States;
- providing 24/7 support for the day-to-day conduct of CSDP crisis management operations;
- providing support for the functioning of the EU-Crisis Coordination Arrangements;
- operating the secure communications networks linking the foreign affairs, defence, intelligence and security communities of the Member States and the Institutions.

On the basis of open source and classified information coming from Member States and the European institutions, SITCEN monitors and assesses international events 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The focus lies on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The information and evaluations provided by EU SITCEN are of a civilian and military nature, covering all aspects of EU crisis management. The SITCEN is also the EU focal point for Situation Centres/Crisis Cells in Members States and in international organisations (UN, OSCE, NATO etc.), as well as in relevant third countries.

The SITCEN acquired its analysis and assessment functions in 2002. It has three units: the Operations Unit, the Analysis Unit and the Consular Unit. The SITCEN is currently part of the General Secretariat of the Council and will be transferred to the European External Action Service (EEAS) when it is established.

CIVILIAN PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY (CPCC)

Established in August 2007, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) has a mandate:

- to plan and conduct civilian CSDP missions under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee;
- to provide assistance and advice in particular to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
- to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian CSDP missions in the areas of police, border assistance management, rule of law and security-sector reform.
CPCC is located in Brussels and currently part of the General Secretariat of the Council. It will be transferred to the European External Action Service when it is established.

It currently has a total staff of about 60, combining officials and seconded national experts (largely senior police officers as well as rule of law, procurement, logistics and finance experts).

CPCC works in close cooperation with the European Commission.

The CPCC Director, as EU Civilian Operations Commander, exercises command and control at strategic level for the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management operations, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative.

CPCC’s main deliverable is a unified and clear chain of command for civilian CSDP missions. Some 3,000 men and women are currently serving in three continents under the civilian CSDP. CPCC is responsible for their well-being and protection on a 24/7 basis and supports them in the day-to-day conduct of the missions. This support ranges from administration and finance to the processing of mission-related planning documents and regular reports through the Council preparatory bodies.

**EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF (EUMS)**

As a result of the Nice Treaty which decided to establish permanent political and military structures, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) was created to provide ‘military expertise and support to the CSDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations.

The EUMS operational mission is to perform early warning and situation assessment and to participate in strategic planning for missions and tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the EU, including those identified in the European Security Strategy.

The role and tasks of the EUMS have some unique characteristics. On one hand, the EUMS is an integral part of the EU crisis management structures and directly attached to the HR, providing in-house military expertise. On the other hand, it operates under the military direction of the EU Military Committee, to which it assists and reports. While this arrangement could be viewed as complex, it provides a critical link between the Armed Forces of the Member States and the Council.

The EUMS also works in close cooperation with other EU crisis management bodies, nota-
bly the CMPD, SITCEN and CPCC. The EUMS will be part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as soon as it is established.

The EUMS’s structure and organization is fully multinational and comprises around 200 military personnel seconded by Member States and acting in an international capacity, as well as civil servants and it is headed by a Director General, a 3-star flag officer.

The Concepts and Capabilities Directorate consists of 3 branches (Concepts, Force Capability, and Exercises/Training/Analysis) and is responsible for EUMS concepts, doctrine, capability development, including crisis management exercises, training, analysis and lesson learnt, and it is the lead Directorate for cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA).

The Intelligence Directorate consists of 3 branches (Intelligence Policy, Intelligence Requirements, and Intelligence Production). It contributes to intelligence support for the work of the EU. It provides intelligence input to early warning, situation assessment and advance planning. It is responsible for geospatial intelligence and also provides intelligence support for crisis response planning and assessments for operations and exercises.

The Operations Directorate plans EU-led military crisis management operations, assists in strategic advance and crisis response planning, including early military planning in support of informed decision-making. It monitors all CSDP military operations and is responsible for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous operation. Within Ops Directorate there are 3 branches: Crisis Response/Current Operations, Military Assessment and Planning and Operations Centre/Watchkeeping Capability. With effect from 1 January 2007, the EU Operations Centre is considered the third option for commanding, from Brussels, missions and operations of limited size. Thus, some EUMS core staff, “double-hatted” EUMS officers and “augmentees” from the Member States, allow an increased capacity to respond to crisis management situation.

The Logistics Directorate serves as a focal point for all matters in the functional areas of logistics, contributes to the EUMS planning
through the provision of logistic planning expertise, is responsible for logistic concepts and doctrine, provides the logistic element of crisis response planning and assessment for operations and exercises and provides support to the EUMS. The LOG Directorate consists of 3 branches: Logistics Policy, Resource Support and Administration.

The Communications and Information System Directorate contributes to the development of policies and guidance for the implementation, operation and maintenance of CIS, in support of CSDP activities. It contributes to EUMS planning through the provision of CIS planning expertise at the strategic and operational level, and provides the CIS element of crises response planning and assessment for operations and exercises. It contributes to the development of the GSC and CSDP CIS security policy and architecture. It provides IT support and maintenance to the EUMS and the EU Operation Centre. It consists of 2 branches: CIS Policy and Requirements and Information Technology Security.

The Executive Office coordinates the EUMS internal staffing procedures and the flow of information both internally and externally.

The Chairman Military Committee Support Unit serves as the focal point for supporting the CEUMC and CEUMC WG in the preparation, execution and evaluation of EUMC/EUM-CWG meetings and acts as the interface/liaison between CEUMC office and the EUMS.

The EU Cell at SHAPE prepares for EU operations having recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus arrangements and supports DSACEUR in his role as the potential operational commander for an EU-led operation. It contributes to full transparency between NATO and the EU and embodies their strategic partnership in crisis management.

In addition, an EUMS military liaison officer to the United Nations is established in New York to further enhance cooperation between the military parts of the two organisations and a NATO liaison team is also present at the EUMS.

**SOURCES FOR MORE AND UPDATED INFORMATION**

For more and updated information see homepage European Council/CSDP: European Council/President: http://www.european-council.europa.eu/CSDP/CSDP Structures and instruments/EU Military Staff
5.2 AGENCIES IN THE FIELD OF CSDP

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004, to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future.

FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

The European Defence Agency, within the overall mission set out in the Joint Action, is allocated four tasks, covering:
- development of defence capabilities;
- promotion of Defence Research and Technology (R&T);
- promotion of armaments co-operation;
- creation of a competitive European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base.

All these tasks relate to improving Europe's defence performance, by promoting consistency. A more integrated approach to capability development will contribute to better defined future requirements on which co-operation – in armaments or R&T or the operational domain – can be built. More co-operation will, in turn, provide opportunities for industrial restructuring and progress towards a continental-wide demand and market, which industry needs.

The EDA is an agency of the European Union and therefore under the direction and authority of the Council, which issues guidelines to and receives reports from the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as Head of the Agency. Detailed control and guidance, however, is the job of the Steering Board.

ORGANISATION OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)
The HR chairs the Steering Board, the principal decision-making body of the Agency, made up of Defence Ministers from 26 participating Member States (all EU members except Denmark) and a member of the European Commission.

In addition to ministerial meetings at least twice a year, the Steering Board also meets at the level of national armaments directors, national research directors, national capability planners and policy directors.

The Chief Executive, his Deputies and the Directors together form the Agency Management Board (AMB), supported by the Planning & Policy Unit.

The Capabilities Directorate works with participating Member States (pMS) to:

- develop defence capabilities to support CSDP as it stands now and will evolve in the future, on the basis of a Capability Development Plan; and
- pool efforts and resources in the development of transformed, interoperable and cost effective armed forces.

Promoting and enhancing European Armaments Co-operation is central to the mission of the European Defence Agency to improve European military capabilities. In October 2008 the European Armaments Co-operation Strategy (EAC) was approved by the Agency’s Steering Board. It provides a clear statement of intent on the part of the participating Member States to promote and enhance more effective European armaments co-operation in support of the Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP).

The Industry & Market Directorate works to create a more competitive defence equipment market and a stronger defence technological and industrial base in Europe.

The Research and Technology (R&T) Directorate is responsible for the achieving Agency’s goal of enhancing the effectiveness of European Defence Research & Technology by:

- acting as a catalyst for more European R&T collaboration, focussed on improving defence capabilities; and
- developing policies and strategies to strengthen defence technology in Europe.

EU SATELLITE CENTRE (EUSC)

The Centre was founded in 1992 under the WEU and incorporated as an agency into the European Union on 1 January 2002. It is located in Torrejón de Ardoz, in the vicinity of Madrid, Spain.

In line with the European Security Strategy, the Satellite Centre supports decision-making in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), including European Union crisis management operations, by providing products resulting from the analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data, including aerial imagery and related services.

Furthermore, the Centre ensures close cooperation with Community space-related service. It also maintains contacts with other national and international institutions in the same field.

The staff of the Centre consists of experienced image analysts, geospatial specialists and support personnel from EU Member States. The Centre also hosts seconded experts from Member States and Third States. The EUSC Board, consisting of representatives from Member States and the EU Commission, appoints the Director and approves the annual budget as well as the work programme of the Centre. Furthermore, the Board serves as a forum for discussion on issues related to the Centre’s functioning, staff and equipment. It meets at least twice per year, but in practice more often, and is chaired by the High Representative or his representative.

The EU Satellite Centre may be tasked not only by the Council and its bodies, but also

**SOURCES FOR MORE AND UPDATED INFORMATION**

Further details are set out in the Joint Action establishing the European Defence Agency. This and more up-to-date information can be found on the EDA’s webpage: www.eda.europa.eu
by the EU Commission, EU Member States and Third States. If the request is relevant in the field of CFSP, in particular the CSDP, international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) may also task the Centre. As regards the UN is the support provided to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan.

The Satellite Centre’s areas of priority reflect the key security concerns as defined by the European Security Strategy, such as monitoring regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For example, the EUSC gives support to EU operational deployment (such as EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUFOR R.D. Congo) and humanitarian aid missions and peacekeeping missions. The Centre is also an important early warning tool, facilitating information for early detection and possible prevention of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises.

The Centre carries out tasks in support of the following activities:
- general security surveillance of areas of interest
- Petersberg type tasks,
- support for humanitarian and rescue tasks,
- support for peacekeeping tasks,
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,
- treaty verification,
- contingency planning,
- arms and proliferation control (including Weapons of Mass Destruction),
- support for exercises,
- other activities, such as judicial investigations.

More information on the tasks of the different divisions and on the work and the projects of the EUSC in general can be found on its webpage: www.eusc.europa.eu
EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (EU ISS)

The EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) was established by the Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 (revised by Council Joint Action of 21 December 2006) as a replacement for the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies (established in July 1990). It was inaugurated on 1 January 2002.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is located in Paris, operating in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its goals are to find a common security culture for the EU, to help develop and project the CFSP, and to enrich Europe’s strategic debate.

The board of the EUISS is chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The EUISS is an autonomous agency with full intellectual freedom. As a think tank, it researches security issues of relevance for the EU and provides a forum for debate. In its capacity as an EU agency, it also offers analyses and forecasting to the Council of the European Union.

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6 THE EU AS AN ACTIVE PLAYER
6.1 CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM – FROM PETERSBERG TO LISBON

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in February 1992 and establishing the European Union, was a milestone in the development of the EU’s involvement in the field of Foreign and Security Policy. At that time the EU had no operational capacities but a clear political will to evolve into a global actor. Therefore the operational tasks were given to another organisation, the Western European Union (WEU), which was reactivated during the disintegration process of the Yugoslav Republic.

In June 1992 at a Council of Ministers of the Western European Union in Petersberg, a conference location near Bonn/Germany, the WEU gave itself their new tasks:

4. Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU Member States, acting under the authority of the WEU, could be employed for:
   • humanitarian and rescue tasks;
   • peacekeeping tasks;
   • tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

These tasks were incorporated in the legal framework of the European Union by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. With the creation of the (Common) European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU established its own operational capabilities in the military and
civilian field. In 2003 the first ESDP missions started, in January a civilian police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) and in March a military operation in FYROM (Concordia).

In the context of the Intergovernmental Conference for a “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, the so-called “Petersberg tasks” were revisited and extended. Besides this task catalogue, some other missions were included which will have an impact on the capability development of the CSDP instruments, namely the solidarity clause and a mutual assistance clause.

CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM

Although the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” was not ratified, the task catalogue was transferred unchanged to the Treaty of Lisbon. After the end of the ratification process and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, from 1 December 2009 the mission spectrum is as follows:

Art. 42 TEU: “1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”

Art. 43 TEU: “1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

Some argue that the scope of the CSDP task catalogue did not expand compared to the Petersberg tasks from 1992. Taking into account the fact that the Petersberg tasks made a reference to a framework including missions from search and rescue to peace-making, everything which is now stated in Art. 42 TEU was already within this framework.

Others argue that the scope expanded because new capabilities are addressed. For example disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks could require tools other than those which were planned to execute the Petersberg tasks.

Regardless whether the original Petersberg tasks were enlarged compared to the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, the new horizontal task “terrorism” was introduced, which is new and will have an impact on the fight against terrorism.

Besides this CSDP task catalogue, another challenge for the CSDP is the newly introduced mutual assistance clause in Art. 42 (7) TEU:

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation."

The mutual assistance clause is based on the UN principle of collective self-defence and underlines the EU guiding principle of solidarity. The content differs compared to similar paragraphs in other treaties (e.g. NATO, WEU). For example the application of this clause is based on “armed aggression”, which is more extensive than an “armed attack”. The geographical area refers to the territory of the EU Member States, which could be seen as a virtually worldwide responsibility. And finally the means for assistance are not limited to military or civilian assets, but must be interpreted to be as comprehensive as the full engagement of the EU in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Nevertheless the various types of Member States are respected: those which are neutral, non-allied and members of NATO.

TERRORISM

Terrorism can be found within the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, implicitly in the mutual assistance clause of Art. 42 (7) TEU and explicitly in the solidarity clause of Art. 222 TFEU. Taking these rules all together, the European Union will face the phenomenon “terrorism” within and outside the EU, preventively or in the form of consequence management. There are no clear indications whether one rule will be preferred in practice. One could argue that the CSDP task catalogue and the mutual assistance clause are designed for the fight against terrorism outside the territory of the EU, whereas the solidarity clause will be the rule for the EU territory itself. The fight against terrorism in the sense of preventive engagement remains an open question.

By including the task “fight against terrorism” in all relevant paragraphs of the Treaty which will influence capability development in the EU, the Union made a clear and promising statement that it will be ready and prepared to face the challenge and protect its citizens worldwide against any kind of terrorist threat.

GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF THE MISSION SPECTRUM

The CSDP task catalogue was created for missions abroad, whereas the mutual assistance clause prioritises operations to fight armed aggression inside and preventively also outside the EU.
6.2 DECISION MAKING IN THE FIELD OF CSDP

The EU is in a unique situation having at its disposal a wide range of instruments and means (political, diplomatic, economic, financial, civilian and military) necessary for effective international crisis management. This is an advantage but at the same time a real challenge, as described in the European Security Strategy (ESS):

"The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All this can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries ... Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command ..."

In 2000 to 2003, the EU evolved and gave itself Crisis Management Procedures to facilitate the effective co-ordination of the various crisis management players and instruments used.

The Crisis Management Procedures differentiate between the following phases (see text box).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRISIS MANAGEMENT PHASES</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Routine phase</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Crisis build-up and elaboration of a Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Approval of the Crisis Management Concept and development of Strategic Options</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Formal decision to take action and development of planning documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Refocusing of EU action and termination of mission/operation.</td>
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</table>
During **Phase 1**, the EU – within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as within the relevant geographic and thematic Council Working Groups – carries out monitoring, exchange of information and policy-shaping. The relevant services in the Council Secretariat, and in the future in particular the European External Action Service, contribute to monitoring, early warning including situation assessment, development of policy option papers and advance planning.

Once the attention of the PSC is drawn to a developing crisis, it discusses the situation in the light of input from relevant actors with a view to developing a common political understanding of the crisis. In its regular meetings at least twice a week, the PSC analyses the situation and – and a certain stage – considers that EU action is appropriate. This is the start of the planning processes.

When the PSC considers that EU action is appropriate (**Phase 2**), a Crisis Management Concept is drawn up, describing the EU’s political interests, the aims and final objective, together with the major politico-strategic options for responding to that particular crisis, including the possible exit strategy. This planning document in particular contributes to the overall consistency of the EU action.

Once finalised in the PSC, the CMC is adopted by the Council (**Phase 3**). It then serves as the basis for developing strategic options. Depending on what the conflict context requires, these can be military (MSO), police (PSO) or other civilian strategic options (CSO). MSOs are prepared by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), PSOs and CSOs by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). The PSC identifies which option will be pursued.

The Council can then take a decision to act (**Phase 4**) adopting a Council Joint Action drawn
up by the Working Group of Foreign Relations Counsellors (Relex Group). This is the legal act which establishes the mission or operation, appoints the Operation Commander or Head of the Mission and decides on the financial issues. The appointed Operation Commander and/or Head of Mission are then responsible for developing the operational planning documents. The key documents in this regard are the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN). The first outlines how it is intended to implement the operation and the latter describes in detail how the operation is organised.

Once the OPLAN has been approved, the Council can launch the operation (Phase 5). The PSC then exercises “political control and strategic direction” of the operation. On a regular basis, the PSC assesses whether an operation needs to be refocused or terminated (Phase 6). A decision by the Council to terminate an operation is followed by a lessons-learned process.

These Crisis Management Procedures are suggestions for a coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management covering every phase in a developing crisis. They guide the EU's responses to a crisis in a co-ordinated way.

However, the Crisis Management Procedures are rather a set of tools to be used in a flexible way. They do not limit the EU to developing its approach to a crisis in all the sequences set down in the procedures. As shown in the table, some of the processes may be skipped altogether e.g. to shorten the process when rapid reaction is required as illustrated in the table. Closer co-operation with international organisations (e.g. with NATO, using the Berlin-Plus arrangements) do also impact the processes.

Furthermore, many of the processes, such as the development of the Crisis Management Concept, are iterative in nature and specific action such as the appointment of an OHQs and an Operation Commander may be made in the process at any suitable moment.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes GAFRC April 2004</td>
<td>yes PSC notes draft on 26.9.2006</td>
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<td>MSOD</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>…</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>…</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMD</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>PSC agrees release on 22.2.2004</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>PSC and Council approve in Sep 2004</td>
<td>yes PSC notes draft on 23.8.2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>PSC and Council approve in Oct 2004</td>
<td>yes PSC approves on 9.9.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>~ 3 months</td>
<td>~ 3 weeks</td>
<td>~ 10 months</td>
<td>~ 4 months</td>
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</table>
6.3 COMMAND AND CONTROL OPTIONS

In the absence of a permanent military command and control structure, the EU has three strategic options for commanding and controlling military operations.

Firstly, it can have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities using the Berlin-Plus arrangements. In this case, the preferred option is to establish the EU Operation Headquarters at SHAPE.

Secondly, the EU can have recourse to the Member States’ assets and capabilities. In this case, the OHQ will be provided by one of the Member States (France, Germany, Greece, Italy and UK).

Thirdly, the EU can activate its Operations Centre in the EU Military Staff to plan and conduct an autonomous EU operation when the Council decides to draw on the collective capacity of the EU Military Staff for an operation which requires a civilian as well as a military response and when no national Operation Headquarters has been identified.

The following diagram illustrates the different command and control structures which need to be identified for civilian missions and military operations.
6.4 CIVILIAN MISSIONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Following the development and establishment of its structures and procedures, the EU started its operational engagement in 2003 with first civilian missions (EU Police Missions in BiH) and military operations (Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM). Since then it conducted more than 20 civilian and military operations. This handbook will not elaborate on the details. The attached world map provides a general overview of all past and current civilian missions and military operations.
INTRODUCTION

External actions of the European Union are – thematically and financially – much broader than the crisis management operations under CSDP. They comprise, among other measures, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Stability and Humanitarian Aid. In total the multiannual financial framework provides for a maximum expenditure of 55.935 million euros for the “EU as a world player” during 2007 – 2013. This chapter will, however, focus specifically on the principles of the financing of crisis management operations stricto sensu, i.e., civilian missions and military operations.

GENERAL RULES

The TEU lays down the basic rules on the financing of crisis management operations. According to Article 41 (1) TEU administrative expenditure of the institutions arising from the implementation of the CSDP, both for civilian missions and military operations, will be charged to the budget of the European Union. The same applies, as a general rule, to operating expenditure under Article 41 (2) TEU, except for cases (a) where the Council – acting unanimously – decides otherwise and (b) for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications.

If expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it is generally charged to the Member States in accordance with their gross national product (unless, again, the Council unanimously decides otherwise). If, on a decision to embark on an operation having military

LEGAL BASIS

Articles 31 and 41 TEU, Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December 2008 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena), Articles 313 ff TFEU.

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

Civilian missions are funded from the general budget of the European Union which is decided upon by the Council and the European Parliament. Title 19 of the budget covers “External Relations”, and its Chapter 3 is specifically dedicated to Common Foreign and Security Policy (the “CFSP budget”, as it is called). It is implemented by the European Commission.

The CFSP budget amounts to just over 280 million euros in 2010. The relevant sub-divisions (articles) are “Monitoring and implementation of peace and security processes” (commitments of 3 million euros), “Conflict resolution and other stabilisation measures” (137 million euros), and “Police missions” (approx. 61 million euros). In order to be able to respond flexibly and finance urgent needs 5 million euros are provided for under the heading “Emergency measures”.

6.5 FINANCING OF CSDP ACTIONS
MILITARY OPERATIONS

After temporary financing mechanisms for operations CONCORDIA and ARTEMIS, the Council, in February 2004, established a permanent “mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena)”. ATHENA, in capital letters, as it is usually referred to, has a permanent structure and functional legal capacity. It acts on behalf of the participating Member States (all MS of the EU, except Denmark), and third States, if the latter contribute to the financing of the common costs of a specific operation.

Given that the contributions are provided by the MS based on a GNI scale (ranging currently from less than 0.5 % to more than 20 % per MS) it may be considered a logical consequence that ATHENA is managed under the authority of a Special Committee (SC) which is composed of a representative of each participating MS and takes decisions by unanimity.

ATHENA basically, covers the incremental costs for headquarters, certain infrastructure works, medical services, and satellite images during the active phase of an operation. Further expenditure may be authorised by the SC upon request by the Operation Commander who bears the overall financial responsibility. If the Council so decides, also transport to and from the theatre of operations for deployment, support and recovery of the forces will be considered as operational common costs. In addition, certain measures in the preparatory and winding-up phases of an operation are borne by ATHENA, as well as specific general costs and joint costs of EU exercises.

The 2010 ATHENA budget provides for (in commitment appropriations) around 23,1 million euros for EUFOR ALTHEA and 9,95 million for ATALANTA out of a total of 34,6 million euros. It will, however, be adjusted if new operations are started. Overall, one has to bear in mind that the costs financed in common account for less than 10% of the total costs for an operation, the rest follows the principle “costs lie where they fall”.

CONCLUSION

The ATHENA mechanism is a very flexible instrument for the financing of military operations. This also holds true of periodical revisions of the mechanism as such. The EU budget, in some respects, lacks this flexibility. Its advantage, however, lies in the democratic control at European level which is exercised by the European Parliament as co-legislator of the budget.

Above all, the political will to provide sufficient funding, both for civilian and military operations, in order to fulfil the respective tasks is of paramount importance.
7 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
7.1 THE RATIONALE FOR EUROPEAN CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

The European Union has played a central role over recent decades in the construction of an economic area. By contrast, Europe has yet to emerge as an equally powerful and credible player at the level of external policies. It is vital that the Europe of the future be more than a bit player on the world stage: Europe must be in a position to project and protect its core interests and shared values. That is the common political goal of all Member States.

It follows that Europe must speak with one voice if its political aspirations are to be effectively articulated and clearly understood. For the European Union to emerge as a powerful political force at world level, however, it must think and act as a Union with respect to security and defence. And this is the basis of a Common Security and Defence Policy.

Full implementation of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy is a sine qua non if Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is to be accepted as a credible instrument of international policy at the sharp end of crisis management. Only then will the Common Foreign and Security Policy be perceived as a coherent and comprehensive political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, civil and military instrument. Articulation and implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy thus emerges as a key priority for the European Union.

If the European Union is to assert and sustain its political credibility and determination, it is imperative that it be able to act across the full spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks and the new additional tasks defined in the Lisbon Treaty. A credible capability for military intervention is indispensable to underpin the political aspirations of non-violent conflict prevention. Accordingly, the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 reached agreement on development of civilian and military assets required to take decisions across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis resolution.

As far as military capabilities are concerned, the European Headline Goal provides the quantitative and qualitative framework for armed intervention across the full range of the mission spectrum.

On the non-military side, the European Union has built up over recent decades an arsenal of political, diplomatic and civil instruments which are conducive to the attainment of its foreign policy objectives. The crisis in the Balkans demonstrated the need to reinforce and expand those instruments in order to improve their effectiveness. The Council has taken the view that a number of areas need to be addressed including policing, promoting the rule of law, strengthening civil administrations, ensuring protection for civilian populations and monitoring.

NEED FOR CIVIL-MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Top-quality civil and military resources and assets are indispensable to effective European crisis management. The crises and conflicts that beset the international community today are, however, of an increasingly complex nature. As a general rule, they are less susceptible to traditional military intervention; moreover, questions of collective defence are increasingly less relevant to the majority of
conflicts in today’s world. As a result, peacekeeping operations frequently extend beyond mere separation of the belligerent parties by military means: they are progressively multifunctional and are conducted in tandem with a series of civil initiatives, including the institution or reinforcement of civil administrations in a crisis region. What is more, military resources and capacities are often used in support of essentially civil missions, as in the case, for example, of humanitarian missions and rescue operations. Bundling and effective co-ordination of available assets thus make a vital contribution to the overall efficiency and effectiveness.

This is particularly true of the European Union and its announced intention within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy to use the full gamut of instruments at its disposal in the best interests of conflict prevention and crisis management. In effect, the Common Security and Defence Policy has combined both civil and military resources into a single institutional framework. This, in theory, should enable the articulation of concepts and methodologies that allow for efficient co-ordination of resources at all times and at every level. While this is readily acceptable in theory, however, the fact remains that practical implementation represents one of the principal challenges facing the Union at the present time, inasmuch as the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military players are frequently high disparate and, in some instances of civilian-military co-ordination, constitute entirely new territory.

The Swedish Presidency held a seminar in Brussels on EU civil-military capability development in September 2009 to discuss experiences from CSDP missions and operations and discussed prospects for future civilian and military capability development. Key findings of the seminar were, inter alia that work is already ongoing and potential synergies between the civilian and the military capability development processes should be further explored in areas where an added value can be achieved.
7.2 DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

**FEIRA COUNCIL IN JUNE 2000 IDENTIFIED FOUR AREAS FOR PRIORITY ACTION OF CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT:**

- police, to enable the EU to carry out all its missions, including substitution for failing local authorities; 5000 police officers, 1000 of whom can be deployed within 30 days, were considered necessary;
- rule of law, in order to strengthen the judicial systems called on to supplement the action of the police. The estimated need was for 3000 experts;
- civilian administration, in order to create a rapidly-deployable pool of experts to act wherever local government authorities are deemed unable to do so during a crisis;
- civil protection, with the identification of three emergency assessment teams for crisis situations, and up to 2000 experts in various fields who could be deployed rapidly with their equipment.

Since the Feira Council in 2000, progress has been reached in the development of civilian capabilities based on a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 set by the Council in 2004. Capability planning under the Headline Goal 2008 was based on virtual planning scenarios representing a selection of possible situations calling for EU action under CSDP. Subsequently, a detailed list of personnel for possible civilian missions to be launched in those situations was established, and Member States were invited to indicate personnel that could potentially be made available. A comparison between the member States’ indications and the capabilities required provided a comprehensive picture of the actual state of EU preparedness for civilian CSDP missions.

Thoroughly evaluating the progress made with the Headline Goal 2008 and the challenges ahead, at the ministerial Civilian Capability Improvement Conference in 2007, Ministers have decided to adopt the new Headline Goal 2010. On the basis of this guidance, work on the Headline Goal 2010 started in 2008 with a review of illustrative scenarios, assessing new required capabilities and surveying civilian capabilities. The following priority areas were set:

- Strengthening the EU’s capability to plan and deploy several missions at the same time, in particular in rapid-response situations;

**EUPOL COPPS – Italy provides, through EUPOL COPPS, 28 vehicles to the Palestinian Traffic Police, Ramallah, 22 December 2009**
• Continuing to develop suitable management tools for efficiently mobilising capabilities needed for civilian missions;
• Improving training for personnel likely to be deployed on missions, and continuing to strengthen civilian response teams;
• Developing the administrative, financial, logistical and human resources aspects of the mission support function, including by seeking to optimise the synergy between civilian and military assets;
• Developing national strategies to facilitate the deployment of mission personnel and encourage exchange of good practices between Member States;
• Strengthening coherence and synergies between CSDP missions and other EU instruments;
• Introducing a proper feedback system for CSDP civilian missions.

While keeping the proven planning methodology, the added value with the Headline Goal 2010 is mainly in terms of new, more comprehensive scenarios, better exploring co-operation and co-ordination inside and outside the EU, but also in developing and implementing specific new concepts and civilian capability management tools, as well as addressing more quality issues at all levels.

Furthermore, the Headline Goal 2010 sets the military and civilian capability development processes on a synchronised track, which inherently facilitates synergy.

CIVILIAN HEADLINE GOAL 2010 PERSPECTIVES

Most personnel in civilian crisis management missions under CSDP are seconded by Member States. Consequently, the wide range of different ministries, services, judicial bodies etc., involved in the secondment process directly influence the EU’s capacity to act. It is therefore important to ensure that the Headline Goal process findings, ranging from conceptual to very practical, would find their way into Member States’ national administrations. To this end, several Civilian Capability Improvement Conferences were held enabling Ministers to guide the Headline Goal 2008 process and to enhance its political visibility.

Several Member States managed to translate recommendations and guidelines emanating from the Headline Goal process in practical terms, often resulting in closer co-operation between the different stakeholder ministries involved. Several Member States declared that they had created structures to better facilitate the recruitment, training and deployment of personnel. There is a clear task for the EU to facilitate and promote equal preparation of Member States so that all may usefully contribute to civilian CSDP. The Headline Goal 2008 has certainly achieved encouraging results in this respect but more needs to be done.
7.3 DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

HELSINKI HEADLINE GOAL

To develop European military capabilities, Member States set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons).

These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.

Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.

They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.

In June 2004, Member States set themselves a new Headline Goal 2010 built upon the Helsinki Headline Goal with a view to achieving the objectives set by the European Security Strategy. Under the new Headline Goal, the EU should be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations. The focus is in particular on the qualitative aspects of capability development and to improve the interoperability and deployability and support capacity for the forces.

In the context of the Headline Goal 2010, the EU Military Committee is developing the military capabilities in several stages (capability development process):

1. The formulation of military capability requirements to fulfil the EU’s missions, leading to the Requirements Catalogue.
2. The identification of the forces made available by Member States on a voluntary basis, leading to the Force Catalogue.
3. The evaluation of contributions against current requirements, identifying the principal capability shortfalls, leading to the Progress Catalogue. This leads also to conclusions for crisis management operations and for future capability development, formulated in the Capability Development Plan.

EUFOR RD CONGO: Real Time Surveillance – 2 August 2006
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is playing a major role in military capability development. In October 2006, EU Defence Ministers endorsed the “Long-Term Vision”, a paper which defines the long-term technological developments depending on the nature of the EU’s future operations. Based on this, the EDA is working on the Capability Development Plan aiming at

- identifying possibilities for co-operation between Member States,
- encouraging harmonisation of national defence planning, and finally
- rendering the Long-Term Vision operational.

EDA is making a significant contribution to the strengthening of European military capabilities by encouraging Member States to increase their co-operation in this field.

The consistency between the EU’s capability development with that of NATO is ensured through a joint EU-NATO Capability Group. This group was established to ensure the transparent and coherent development of military capabilities and to provide a forum for addressing where relevant the overall consistency and complementarity of proposed specific goals, commitments and priorities. It is up to the EU, NATO and Member States of both organisations to draw conclusions from the group’s discussions in the future development of respective goals and capabilities.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) – 11 February 2009

EUFOR Tchad/RCA receives the Russian helicopters – 8 December 2008
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

European Security Strategy
Civilian Headline Goal 2010

Requirements Catalogue
Force Catalogue
Progress Catalogue
Capability Development Plan

What is Europe’s role in the world?
What does Europe want to be able to do militarily?
What military capabilities does that require?

COUNCIL
PSC

Planning: What capabilities does Europe have or want?
What are/will be the capital requirements?

COUNCIL • PSC
CMPD • EUMC • EUMS

What are the most promising solutions?
What are the possible solutions?
What resources?
What assets need to be deployed?

EDA
EUMC

National programmes
Outcomes

MEMBER
STATES
CIVIL-MILITARY CO-ORDINATION
8.1 CIVIL-MILITARY CO-ORDINATION – A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF THE EU

THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

One of the three strategic objectives defined in the European Security Strategy is to tackle the key threats identified, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The strategy further concludes that none of these threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and combated through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, with humanitarian means used to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase.

Hence, the new strategic environment calls for the deployment of a mixture of instruments, of civilian and military capabilities together. Experiences with crisis management operations in the recent past showed that an operation requires a combination of civilian and military tools from the outset. In many cases military security is established quickly but organised crime and other factors continue to thwart a return to normality.

EU IN A UNIQUE SITUATION

In recent years the EU has created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The EU is in such a unique position to have at its disposal all the means and tools necessary for effective international crisis management. This is considered to be the comparative advantage of the EU. The challenge now is to bring together these different instruments and capabilities and to ensure that they all follow the same agenda.

From the start of its operational engagement in international crisis management in 2003, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments together as its particular strength. However, despite all co-ordination efforts, the civilian and military structures have remained to great extent different worlds and the civilian and military crisis management missions and operations are still separate. In this regard the Maastricht Treaty also had an impact, with the division of tasks between the Council and the Commission leading to the fragmentation of responsibilities, capacities and also budgets. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is now a window of opportunity to improve the overall consistency of the EU’s external actions.
PROGRESS MADE IN THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

In recent years the Council has taken a number of decisions to lay down the conditions for better civil-military co-ordination and co-operation, aiming in particular to integrate the civilian and military planning structures and to launch activities relating to civil-military capability development.

A first attempt to create civil-military structures for the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations was made at the end of 2003. A Civil-Military Cell was established within the EU Military Staff to enhance its capacity to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. The cell was led by a military director and a civilian deputy. All in all, it has proved to be a useful step forward towards a better linkage between civil and military strategic planning but its location within the EU Military Staff has raised doubts about its real civil-military character.

In the same context, an Operations Centre was established within the EU Military Staff which became operational in 2007. The aim was to provide for an additional command option in particular in cases where a joint civil-military response might be required and none of the national potential Operation Headquarters might be available.

In response to the lack of a planning and command structure for civilian missions, a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was created and became operational in 2008. As a matter of fact, it is an Operation Headquarters for civilian missions only, responsible for the operational planning and command of civilian missions at the strategic level. The Director of the CPCC acts as the Civilian Operation Commander for all civilian missions.

In 2009, a new decision was taken to further develop the relevant structures at the strategic level, namely to merge the relevant civilian and defence directorates in the Council Secretariat with the Civ-Mil Cell to form a new Crisis Man-
management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). This directorate now operates as an integrated structure for strategic planning of CSDP operations and missions and is also dealing with CSDP policy and capability issues.

All in all, these are useful organisational and institutional steps taken so far at the strategic level which help to improve civil-military co-ordination. However, whether this will be the final solution is arguable. CSDP is and will remain an evolving process, at least in the coming decades. This process might culminate in unified civil-military structures as underlined in 2009 by the former Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Henri Bentégeat. Referring to the progress made so far in civil-military integration, he underlined the importance of establishing an integrated Civil-Military Headquarters for CSDP missions which would, in his view, correspond to a specific requirement of the European Union.

CIVIL-MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Apart from the institutional and organisational aspects, consideration is now given to possible synergic effects in the field of European capability development. It is recognised that further co-ordination of military and civilian efforts is necessary, both at strategic level and in theatre, in order to enhance the capability of the EU to meet complex challenges in the future. Finding synergies between civilian and military efforts is also considered to be cost efficient for the Member States.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Following the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management, civil-military co-ordination is a recognised special training requirement for the EU and should be met through special training courses and through combined civilian and military participation whenever possible, in national and EU-level training. Aspects of civil-military co-ordination are also regularly addressed in EU exercises.

The European Security and Defence College is playing a significant and important role in support of the EU’s comprehensive approach by providing training at strategic level for civil and military personnel of the Member States and the EU Institutions. Training activities of the ESDC bring together diplomats, police, rule of law and civil administration staff and military personnel, thereby contributing to a better mutual understanding. Under the aegis of the college there are also training courses covering specifically civil-military co-ordination issues within the EU and in co-operation with international organisations and partners.

SOURCES FOR MORE AND UPDATED INFORMATION


EUPOL AFGHANISTAN: Carl Bildt visits EUPOL, 31 August 2009
9 OTHER IMPORTANT CSDP-RELATED ASPECTS
9.1 CO-OPERATION WITH THIRD STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International co-operation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-operation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.”

This quote from the European Security Strategy sets the scene for the EU’s co-operation with third states and international organisation in crisis management.

In line with this, the EU is developing an effective and balanced partnership with the United States in particular in counter-terrorism, the fight against the proliferation of WMD and since 2007 also in crisis management. For the first time, the United States committed itself to participating in an CSDP mission (EULEX Kosovo).

Special arrangements exists for the involvement of non-EU European allies (Iceland, Norway and Turkey) in EU military operations, in compliance with the EU’s decision-making autonomy.

Special relations in the field of CSDP are also developing with Canada, Russia and Ukraine. As regards Russia, this has led to the development of a roadmap on security identifying also practical measures for closer co-operation in the field of CSDP. In 2003 Russia contributed to the first EU civilian mission (EU Police Mission in BiH). In November 2008, it formalised an agreement for its contribution to EUFOR Chad/ CAR which represents Russia’s first participation in an EU military operation.

In general, partners interested in making a contribution to a EU mission and operation are kept informed throughout the planning and decision-making process using the existing structures for political dialogue. At a certain stage, they are also invited to the relevant force-generation conferences. Following the decision by the Council to launch the operation, the Committee of Contributors starts its work as the body responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the operation. Contributing partners are represented in the Committee of Contributors with the same rights and obligations as the EU Member States.

The strategic partnership in crisis management between the EU and NATO rests on the so-called Berlin-Plus arrangements adopted in December 2002, under which NATO’s collective assets and capabilities can be made available to the EU for operations.

The Berlin-Plus arrangements include:

- guaranteed access for the EU to NATO planning capabilities for planning its own operations;
presumption of availability to the EU of NATO’s collective capabilities and assets;
identification of European command options which recognise a special role for NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR).

These arrangements were first implemented in spring 2003 for the Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM and in the current operation ALTHEA in BiH.

To support close co-operation in crisis management, an EU cell has been established at SHAPE and a NATO liaison team is hosted in the premises of the EU Military Staff in Brussels.

Between the two organisations, a regular dialogue takes place in non-decision making meetings at various levels, in particular between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and between the two Military Committees. To prevent unnecessary duplication and to ensure overall coherence, the two organisations meet also in the EU-NATO Capability Group to exchange information on capability development processes.

Apart from NATO, the EU has also developed close co-operation in the field of crisis management with the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU). As regards the UN, there are regular meetings of the EU-UN Steering Committee with the participation of the European Commission and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The partnership with the AU has three particular aspects: strengthening the political dialogue, making the African peace and security architecture fully operational and providing predictable funding for the AU’s peacekeeping operations.

The EU also maintains an important dialogue on crisis management with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN).
9.2 TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN THE FIELD OF CSDP

EU TRAINING POLICY AND TRAINING CONCEPT IN THE FIELD OF CSDP

When CSDP development started under the umbrella of the EU, it became obvious that the different aspects of crisis management would require appropriate training, not only offered at national level but complemented by training at EU level, the latter focusing in particular on the promotion of a European diplomatic culture and a European security culture.

To this end, in 2003 and 2004, the Council adopted an EU Training Policy and an EU Training Concept in the field of CSDP. The key objective defined is "the adoption of a holistic and co-ordinated approach on training matters which should aim at establishing links and strengthening synergies between the different training initiatives at EU level, with a particular focus on the interface between military and civilian areas. Such a holistic and co-ordinated training policy would contribute to the overall goal of improving civil-military as well as civil-civil-co-ordination."

Based on the Training Policy and Concept, an annual training management cycle has been established including four phases:
1. an analysis of training needs and requirements in the field of CSDP,
2. based on this, the design of an EU Training Programme listing all training activities offered at EU level,
3. the conduct of these training activities by the various training actors at EU and at national level,
4. an annual evaluation in the form of a “Comprehensive Annual Report on Training Activities in the field of CSDP / CART”.

"
The outer circle of the overview depicts the external dimension. ESDP is an open and transparent process. Close cooperation with third states and international organisations is a basic principle for the EU as regards the conduct of crisis management operations.

The EU Training Programme lists training activities of the EU actors (ESDC) and of the Member States’ national institutes which they open to participation by other nationals. It differentiates between:
- courses of the European Security and Defence College
- other security and defence policy courses,
- training activities in the field of civilian crisis management,
- specific civil-military training activities, also related to inter-pillar co-ordination,
- specific police training activities related to crisis management and
- military training activities in the field of CSDP

Following the EU’s comprehensive approach, training actors are encouraged to combine civilian and military participation whenever possible.

Sources for more and updated information

Since 2009, the EU Training Programme has been run via the internet (“Schoolmaster” application). The internet address is: https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu

The European Security and Defence College

At EU level, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), established in 2005, plays a major role in the implementation of the yearly training cycle relevant to CSDP. Not only does the College contribute significantly to the implementation of the training programme through the delivery of its courses, its Secretariat contributes to the analysis of the training requirements, the development of the EU training programme relevant to CSDP and the evaluation of this training programme through the Comprehensive Annual Report on Training (CART).

ESDC THREE-TIER STRUCTURE

- Steering Committee
  - representatives of the Member States
  - responsible for the overall co-ordination and guidance of the College’s activities
  - convenes in Brussels
  - decision-making body

- Executive Academic Board
  - representatives of the network institutes
  - implements training
  - ensures quality and coherence of training
  - can meet in different

- Permanent Secretariat
  - assists the Steering Committee and the EAB
  - supports conceptual and academic work
  - supports the training activities in particular those taking place in Brussels

- Implementation Group
  - European Initiative for the exchange of young military officers
HIERARCHY OF TRAINING AUDIENCES AND RELATED ESDC TRAINING ACTIVITIES

TRAINING AUDIENCES

High-Ranking Staff/Decision-Makers
(Ambassadors, Generals/Admirals, Directors)

Senior Staff Level
(diplomats, civil servants in capitals, civilian including police, and military personnel)

Expert Level
(diplomats, civilian, including police, and military personnel with a minimum practical experience)

Specialist Level

General (mid rank) Working Level
(diplomats, civilian, including police, and military personnel)

ESDC TRAINING ACTIVITIES

ESDP High-Level Seminar (2 Days)

ESDP High-Level Course

ESDP Orientation Course PPI Staff

ESDP Orientation Course LEGAD Staff

ESDP Orientation Course POLAD Staff

ESDP Orientation Course for National Audiences

ESDP Orientation Course including International Audiences

OC-type course with focus on thematic, regional or horizontal issues

ESDP Training at national level (Member States)
- ESDP training activities for nationals only
- ESDP training activities open to participation of other nationals and listed in the EU Training Programme in the field of ESDP

Training material/IDL system support for all training levels, organised and co-ordinated through the ESDC

ESDP Courses for Specialised Staff

ESDP Orientation Courses/OC-type courses/seminars/ can also be conducted focussing on a specific audience and specific theme

IDL Support
The main objective of the ESDC is to provide Member States and EU Institutions with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on CSDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the College makes a major contribution to a better understanding of CSDP in the overall context of CFSP and to promoting a common European security culture. Helping to build professional relations and contacts at European level, the College activities promote a co-operative spirit and co-operative methods at all levels.

The ESDC is a network college. Several national universities, academies, colleges and institutes contribute to the success of the ESDC. The network members are well-known national civilian and military educational and research institutions in Europe. It also includes the EU Institute for Security Studies located in Paris. The College also co-operates with other external training actors such as the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

A three-tier governance structure has been established for the college’s functioning comprising a Steering Committee, an Executive Academic Board and a Permanent Secretariat. The Secretariat currently has 3 full-time staff members but is supposed to grow to a total of 8 civilian and military staff.

The College established its own training concept addressing all levels of personnel from working level up to the level of decision-makers working in the field of CSDP. In line with this concept, and, as shown in the overview, it offers a growing number and variety of training activities including courses for specialised staff.

All training courses of the ESDC are supported by an Internet-based distance learning system.

**ESDC TRAINING ACTIVITIES**

**STANDARD COURSES**
- CSDP High Level Course (annual/4 Modules)
- CSDP Orientation Course (3 to 5 days)
- CSDP Course for PPI staff (2/3 days)
- Alumni Seminars (participants of the higher level courses)

**NEW TYPES OF TRAINING ACTIVITIES**
- Security Sector Reform/SSR (two types of courses, 3 days and 10 days)
- CSDP Mission Planning Procedures Course (3 days)
- Course on EU Military and Civilian Capability Development (3 days)
- CMCO – Civil Military Co-ordination in CSDP Missions and Operations (10 days)
- International Law for EU Military Legal Advisor (annual/3 Modules)
- Peace Building Course

**SPECIAL ACTIVITIES**
- CSDP Training Modules in the context of exchange programmes of young military officers
- Symposium on Effectiveness of CSDP Operations: Gender Issues
- Annual Networking Conference on Training related to CSDP
Since its establishment in 2005, the college has provided training at strategic level for more than 2200 diplomats, civilians and police and military personnel from Member States and EU Institutions. In addition, since 2006, about 300 civilian and military staff from third states and international organisations have attended CSDP courses of the college.

The success of the ESDC courses lies in a mixture of making the best use of the academic expertise, contacts and experience of our network members and bringing to the courses the practical knowledge of the specialists from the European Institutions working on a day-to day basis on the important dossiers in the field of ESDP. Applying the basic principle of mixed civilian and military audiences in almost all ESDC course, the College makes a significant effort in support of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.

THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY YOUNG OFFICERS INSPIRED BY ERASMUS

A specific task given to the ESDC is to provide support for exchange programmes of the national training institutes.

More concretely, under the French Presidency in the second half on 2008, the Council approved an initiative aimed at increasing the number of international exchanges during the initial academic and professional training of young officers. Subsequently, the ESDC was given a crucial role in the implementation of the initiative.

Building on the existing three-tier structure and the ESDC network, an Implementation Group was created in February 2009 as a task-oriented structure of the ESDC’s Executive Academic Board, charged with implementing this initiative.

Since the start of this initiative, progress has been reached on various aspects of it, including the conduct of common CSDP modules (already done in Portugal and Spain) based on the standard curriculum developed by ESDC. With the cooperation of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Liège, a detailed stocktaking has been finalised which will allow the interested institutes to easily identify partners with whom organise exchanges. A framework arrangement has been agreed which should also facilitate the establishment of exchange programmes for the interested national institutes. Several other common curricula have meanwhile been put at the disposal of the Member States and these courses will start to be held in 2010.

Thanks to the Bulgarian Military University, a dedicated forum for the exchange of information both between cadets and between the members of the Implementation Group has been set up.

ESDC’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EU’S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH – SUMMARY

- significant contribution to implement the EU’s overall training policy (holistic and co-ordinated approach)
- network college including military, civilian and diplomatic training actors
- combined civilian and military participation in ALL ESDC training activities
- curriculum development – standard curricula of main courses and specialised courses reflect the EU’s comprehensive approach
- specialised courses on specific aspects of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management
- training record: since 2005, about 2500 civilian and military personnel trained of which more than 10 % came from third states and international organisations

You can visit the dedicated forum for the Exchange of Military Young Officers on:
http://www.emilyo.eu
9.3 HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER ASPECTS

The European Union launched its first crisis management operation in 2003. Since then it has conducted more than 20 military, police and rule of law operations on three continents. The experience it has gained from earlier and ongoing operations feeds into those currently at the planning stages. In this context, the EU has learned that including Human Rights and Gender approaches in all of its missions makes them more effective.

CSDP operations are aimed at conflict management, preventing crises from unfolding and stabilizing post-conflict situations. Human rights violations are part and parcel of crises and conflicts. The promotion of human rights, with special emphasis on gender and rights of the child and the rule of law are key to sustainable conflict resolution and to lasting peace and security.

In line with the European Security Strategy, over the last few years, a number of practical and concrete steps have been taken in order to ensure mainstreaming of human rights into ESDP.

This includes inter alia

- the development of standard training guidelines for CSDP training;
- the inclusion of human rights aspects in CSDP exercises and in preparatory activities such as fact-finding missions and planning teams.

Last but not least, a handbook has been compiled and made available. The handbook combines the documents that comprise the guiding principles for planners of EU operations. It is intended to serve as a tool for those who cooperate with, plan, train, carry out, evaluate and report on EU crisis management. Making this handbook widely accessible will help us to achieve better mutual understanding and raise awareness of human rights and gender aspects of the ESDP, thus enhancing the synergies of our activities on the ground.

The handbook is a living document, and as CSDP evolves, it will be regularly updated.

**SOURCES FOR MORE AND UPDATED INFORMATION**

The title of the handbook is “Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into ESDP”. It is available on the webpage of the Council: www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/hr/news144.pdf
9.4 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The reform of the security sector has become one of the major topics of international concern in connection with crisis management and post-crisis recovery during the last decade. The focus on traditional security actors such as the police, the military, the judiciary, prison personnel, border guards, and intelligence has been complemented by a more comprehensive view of human security, bringing the basic needs and physical, social and economic security and safety of individuals and the population to the centre of attention.

SSR ACTORS

The core security actors, together with all security management and oversight bodies, the justice and law enforcement institutions as well as non-statutory security forces need to act on the principles of human rights, local ownership, accountability and sustainability in co-operation and co-ordination with other national and international state and non-state actors for creating/developing a stable environment.

The OECD DAC Reference Document Security System Reform and Governance agreed by ministers in 2004 defined the security system as including: core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaint commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution service, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia). It is internationally acknowledged that civil society organisations, international donors and the media have an important role to play in SSR processes as well. In addition, a mainstreamed gender focus needs to be included to make SSR successful.

Several achievements to define common goals for security sector reform have already been made. The UN Secretary General’s Report on SSR (2008) provided an overarching framework for countries and organisations aiming at reforms of security systems. At the EU level, both the Council of the European Union (2005) and the European Commission (2006) have developed plans for SSR support.

POOL OF EUROPEAN SSR EXPERTS

At the meeting on 17 Nov. 2009 the Council of the European Union welcomed the considerable progress made in the implementation of the agreement of November 2008 to enhance the capability of the EU in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR) by creating a pool of European SSR experts to be used in the con-
text of SSR activities carried out by the EU, within the framework of ESDP or Community external action.

The modalities for the setting up of the pool, for the deployment of experts and for training and related activities have been completed, enabling the creation of a community of experts familiar with SSR questions as a whole and sharing a common approach to SSR. The revised CRT concept takes into account the establishment of the pool.

1. In this context, the Council noted work on developing a Guiding Framework for EU SSR Assessments aimed at providing a practical tool for the EU Institutions for assessing and planning possible EU SSR actions both within the framework of ESDP and in Community external actions, also with a view to strengthening the EU’s capacity to implement such actions.

2. The Council encouraged the continuation of efforts to strengthen the EU’s SSR capacity, including through cooperation with other actors, especially the UN, and underlined the importance that the expert pool becomes operational as soon as possible.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SSR

The current implementation of SSR is facing several challenges: SSR calls into question per se existing power structures. Regions and nation states with a very dominant security sector react critically to externally proposed reform strategies. Donor countries need to bridge the gap between their own SSR policies and the imperative of local ownership without which reforms cannot become sustainable. Security sector reform faces a divergence between its holistic approach and various institutional practices so far. International organisations also have different approaches to SSR.

The need to further develop a comprehensive approach and training strategies is more than evident. Successful SSR missions require well-educated and trained experts, at the strategic political and administrative level as well as in the field.

Governments need to streamline their action on security sector reforms both at home and through their development assistance. Unfortunately, too little preparation for experts on SSR is offered. Most of the existing study and training programmes still focus on exclusive approaches of individual security actors rather than a concerted whole-of-government approach.

SSR TRAINING

Training for SSR programmes is only at the initial stage. The UN DPKO SSR Team develops training modules, but needs assistance to serve the needs for capacity building in the international community.

The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) at DCAF has developed a training approach that is implemented on an ad hoc basis tailored to the needs of the recipient group or country. ISSAT has initiated the foundation of the Association for Security Sector Education and Training (ASSET) comprising training institutes which have started SSR training, partly in collaboration with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).

Most recently, under the ESDC, curricula for two courses on SSR have been developed and will be completed through the ESDC relying on qualified national training institutes of the EU Member States.

The curricula are designed for a basic SSR course (3 days) and a core SSR course (7 days), in particular to support the creation of an EU pool of experts for SSR missions.
10 Information Policy in the Field of CSDP
10.1 COMMUNICATING EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – AN OVERVIEW

INFORMATION ON CSDP OPERATIONS ...

Operations are the most visible output of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). With 23 operations (and a 24th in preparation for Somalia at the time of writing) launched since 2003, on four continents, some of them complex missions in challenging, high-profile environments, CSDP has gained increasing recognition as a tangible dimension of the EU’s foreign policy. For each CSDP operation or mission, key aims include on the one hand ensuring the coherence of the message among the different EU stakeholders (definition of an information strategy, preparation of master messages), and on the other hand communicating towards the press and the public on the operation:

Such activities include:

• press information, technical briefings and press conferences involving the main players – political, military or civilian – in an operation, on the occasion of the main events (e.g. decision, launch, termination); press trips;
• press releases and High Representative statements on the occasion of these or other events;
• production and circulation of print, Internet and audiovisual material on each operation (see below).

... AND ON CSDP STRUCTURES AND CAPABILITIES

The CSDP press team in the Council Secretariat, in contact with other partners, also actively communicates on developments regarding the CSDP’s civilian and military structures and the capability process. It does so notably in relation with events such as meetings of EU defence ministers (informal or in the framework of the Foreign Affairs Council) or the launch of a given project: EU Battle-groups (on which it seeks to coordinate with Member States e.g. regarding media coverage of BG exercises); Operations Centre (cf. press visit on the activation of the OpsCentre during the exercise MILEX 07). Steering Board meetings and other events in the European Defence Agency are opportunities to conduct information activities on the EDA’s work.

A WIDE RANGE OF PRODUCTS AND RESOURCES

Over the last years, the CSDP press team has developed a range of information and communication products on CSDP. It does so in cooperation with other stakeholders such as the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), the EU Institute for Security Studies and the European Defence Agency, as well as with the European Commission regarding the EU’s external action as a whole.
PRINT MATERIAL

Institutional print material on CSDP includes the following items:

- ESDP newsletter (six-monthly, circulation around 20,000 copies): 9 issues published since December 2005. The newsletter aims to present CSDP operations and other activities in a clear, illustrative way for both a specialised readership and the wider public;
- a range of booklets (cf. “the EU, an exporter of peace and security” since 2003, the European Security Strategy booklet, as well as thematic/regional strategies cf. EU-Africa;
- a range of fact sheets and background documents produced for each CSDP operation and on specific topics (e.g. the EU Engagement in Afghanistan or in Somalia, the EU Battlegroups, military capabilities);
- the EU Military Staff’s bulletin, Impetus, aimed primarily at a military readership;
- in cooperation with the European Commission, material on “EU in the world – working for peace, security and stability”;
- material produced by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS Newsletter, quarterly, Chaillot Papers, Occasional Papers, books (e.g. “What ambitions for European defence in 2020?”);
- material produced by the European Defence Agency (e.g. EDA bulletin, quarterly and specific leaflets).

INTERNET

The Council of the EU’s web site hosts the CSDP homepage: www.consilium.europa.eu/csdp, which contains information on:

- all CSDP operations and missions (including links towards specific operation websites where applicable);
- CSDP news;
- structures, notably the EU Military Staff, the EU Military Committee, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC);
- capabilities;
- the European Security Strategy.
Other institutional Internet resources include:
• (EU Institute for Security Studies)
  www.eda.europa.eu
  (European Defence Agency)
• www.eusc.europa.eu
  (EU Satellite Centre)
• www.eeas.europa.eu
  (External action website)

**AUDIOVISUAL MATERIAL**

The development of an audiovisual offer on CSDP has been a priority in recent years. A range of resources are now available.
• Video material (VNRs – Video News Releases – and stock shots) is produced and made available for televisions on specific occasions such as the launch of an operation; such material can be found and downloaded in broadcast quality on www.tvnewsroom. consilium.europa.eu
• a YouTube CSDP page is available: www. youtube.com/EUSecurityandDefence
• some of the audiovisual material is released in the form of DVDs for distribution to the wider public (since 2003);
• cooperation with productions by TV channels on CSDP;
• a CSDP photo library is being developed. A selection is available online on the Council website.
• Arrangements are being developed with individual Member States concerning the sharing of audiovisual resources notably in the context of operations.

**PRESS TRIPS**

Press visits to the theatre of CSDP operations and missions have been organised since 2004 for European journalists. Visits to Balkans, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Aceh (Indonesia), Chad (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) or on EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, have notably been organised under the “Prince” programme in order to highlight the EU’s comprehensive activities on the ground (CSDP operation and EU Delegation). Other visits are organised on the basis of the resources of the operations themselves.

**LOOKING FOR SYNERGIES AND OUTREACH: TOWARDS A “CSDP PUBLIC DIPLOMACY”**

The Council Secretariat has been trying to develop synergies with and among Member States, including through mutual information concerning products and initiatives.
• Meetings of officials in charge of information and communication on CSDP have been organised since 2001 in the framework of the Council’s Working Party on Information. These meetings provide opportunities to exchange information, material and experience;
• an extranet network – “Infonet CSDP” – is available to share information on CSDP related communication activities among EU Member States and institutions;
• regular information on communication activities is given to Council bodies, including the Political Security Committee and the Military Committee.

Increasingly, outreach and awareness-raising activities have been developed by the Secretariat and other stakeholders.
• The European Security and Defence College contributes to raising the awareness of CSDP in Member States but also beyond. An annual CSDP Press and Public Information Course has been established in 2006 in
the framework of the ESDC. The course aims to provide press and information personnel from EU Member States, EU institutions and CSDP missions and operations with up-to-date knowledge of CSDP and to facilitate the sharing of experience;
• the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris is also a key player in outreach activities on CSDP. As a European body where leaders, the media, academics, industrialists and elected representatives rub shoulders on a day-to-day basis, it contributes to spreading the ideas and values on which the EU’s foreign and security policy is founded. Information and communication activities are part of its work together with academic research and policy analysis and the organisation of seminars (including the Institute’s Annual Conference, at which the High Representative delivers an address on the state of the Common foreign and security policy). The Institute’s work involves a network of exchanges with other research institutes and think-tanks both inside and outside the European Union. The Institute’s output is distributed widely;
• the Council Secretariat and the Commission regularly co-organise seminars for journalists, think-tanks and NGOs on the topic “the EU in the world”, including CSDP; These activities are likely to be continued under the new Lisbon Treaty notably by the European External action service (due to be created in the course of 2010) with other partners.

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ANNEXES
COURSE ON COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)

ILLUSTRATIVE COURSE PROGRAMME

MAIN THEME: THE EUROPEAN UNION/INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Session 1 EU Institutional Framework and Treaties / Role of the Council, European Parliament and the European Commission

The European Union has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the strengthening of the security of the European Union in all ways, preserving peace, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Through the CFSP, the EU expresses its positions on the international scene and acts consistently where the Member States share common interests. Within the context of the CFSP, the Union is developing a common security and defence policy (CSDP), covering all questions relating to its security, including the progressive framing of a common defence, should the Council so decide.

The Council of the EU plays a vital role in implementing this policy and the European Commission is fully associated with it. The role of the European Parliament in relation to CFSP/CSDP is to be further elaborated.

This session will provide an overview of the EU’s institutional setting. Speakers will in particular focus on the role of the relevant EU Institution in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Session 2 “A Secure Europe in a Better World” – The European Security Strategy (ESS)

“Our ambition is a Europe more active and more capable; an articulate and persuasive champion of effective multilateralism; a regional actor and a global ally. The preparation of the European Security Strategy has helped us to discover a remarkable convergence of views on security issues between EU Member States and to uncover an authentic and uniquely European voice on security issues. The challenge ahead is to persuade and implement.” (Javier Solana former HR for the CFSP)

This session will provide an insight into the European Security Strategy, the risk assessment, the main strategic objectives identified in the strategy and the policy implications for Europe. It should also give an update on the state of affairs as regards the implementation of the ESS.

Session 3 CSDP Development: Overview

This session will provide an overview of CSDP, its historical background, main political decisions leading to the development of CFSP/CSDP within the European Union. It will also discuss the areas in which progress has been made since the Cologne European Council in June 1999.
Session 1  Civilian and Military Structures
At the Cologne meeting in June 1999, the European Council decided that “the
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible mili-
tary forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”. It was on that
basis that continued efforts led to the establishment of permanent political, civilian
and military structures with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) playing a
central role in the field of CFSP/CSDP.
This session will provide a comprehensive overview of the existing civilian and mili-
tary structures, their functioning and inter-relationship.

Session 2  EU’s Crisis Management Procedures and Decision Making Process
The European Union developed a set of crisis management procedures to enable
the Union to take decisions on operational engagement in international crisis man-
agement.
This session will introduce the key steps of EU decision making. It will also examine
“theory versus practice”, how decision making is done in practice in past and cur-
rent missions/operations.

Session 1  Development of Civilian Capabilities
ESS: “In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by
civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to
bear in crisis and post crisis situations.”
This session will provide an overview of the development of European civilian capa-
bilities in particular in the context of the Headline Goal 2010.

Session 2  Development of Military Capabilities
ESS: “A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to real-
ise our full potential. Actions under way – notably the establishment of a defence
agency – take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more flexible,
mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for
defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.”
This session will inform on the state of affairs as regards the development of the military capabilities in particular in the context of the Headline Goal 2010.

Session 3  European Defence Agency (EDA)
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established by a Joint Action of the Coun-
cil of Ministers on 12 July, 2004 “to support the Member States in their effort to
improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sus-
tain the CSDP as it stands now and develops in the future”. This session will provide
an overview of the EDA’s main functions, its organisation and current work.
MAIN THEME: WORKING WITH PARTNERS (ESS)

Session 1  EU – NATO Relations
ESS: “The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin-Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management.”
This session will consider the current state of affairs on co-operation between EU and NATO in crisis management.

Session 2  EU – UN Relations
ESS: “The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.”
This session will provide a brief overview of EU-UN co-operation in the field of CSDP.

Session 3  EU – AU Relations
ESS: “Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union … regional organisations such as … the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.” Over the past years, the EU developed successfully co-operation with the African Union in many field of CSDP.
This session will provide a brief overview of past and current efforts to co-operate.

Session 4  Co-operation with Third States in the field of CSDP
ESS: “There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats … are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International co-operation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-operation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.”
This session will consider EU co-operation with third states like Canada, Ukraine, Russia in the field of CSDP.
MAIN THEME: TO BE MORE ACTIVE (ESS)

Session 1 EU Crisis Management – Past, Current and Potential Future Operations and Missions overview

ESS: “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. As a Union of 27 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.” This session will provide an overview of EU’s operational engagement in Civilian and Military Crisis Management.

Session 2 Human Rights and Gender Aspects

ESS: “Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.” This session will examine human rights and gender aspects and their impact on sustainable conflict resolution. It will inform on EU policies, concepts and action taken to implement respective UNSC Resolutions in the context of CSDP in general and in EU missions and operations in particular.

MAIN THEME: TO BE MORE COHERENT (ESS)

Session Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO)

The EU is in a unique situation to have at its disposal all instruments (political, diplomatic, economic, financial, civil and military) necessary for international crisis management. The challenge is now to bring together the different instruments and capabilities. Effective co-ordination of all the instruments is necessary for the EU to achieve maximum impact and exert maximum political leverage through its crisis management operations. This session will inform on the principles of civil-military co-ordination (CMCO) and practical measures taken so far in the field of CSDP to improve co-ordination between all relevant instruments and actors.

MAIN THEME: CSDP FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Session CSDP Development – Challenges and Prospects

This session will examine the future perspectives of the CSDP. The speaker will consider essential factors which likely will impact the further development and will draw from this conclusions how CSDP might further evolve.
A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Brussels, 12 December 2003
Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO.

The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.
I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

Global Challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people worldwide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

45 million people die every year of hunger and malnutrition... AIDS contributes to the breakdown of societies... Security is a precondition of development

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world’s population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.
Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years. The last use of WMD was by the Aum terrorist sect in the Tokyo underground in 1995, using sarin gas. 12 people were killed and several thousand injured. Two years earlier, Aum had sprayed anthrax spores on a Tokyo street.
years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

**Regional Conflicts:** Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

**State Failure:** Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

**Organised Crime:** Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come
to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade worldwide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.
II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the Threats
The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.

- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or south-east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global...
communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.
The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - which Europe has long supported - is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.
AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.
It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.
**More Capable.** A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.
More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Working with partners There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.
We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

**Conclusion**

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.
Executive Summary

Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.

The EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better. Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, in places such as Afghanistan or Georgia.

Yet, twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges.

Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world remain unsolved, others have flared up even in our neighbourhood. State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy. Terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability in the region and for the whole non-proliferation system.

Globalisation has brought new opportunities. High growth in the developing world, led by China, has lifted millions out of poverty. But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society - such as information systems and energy supplies - are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.

Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past.
Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation.

Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support.

Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues - anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world. For Europe, the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.

The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.
Introduction

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It gives an opportunity to examine how we have fared in practice, and what can be done to improve implementation.

I. GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

The ESS identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation by both states and terrorists was identified in the ESS as ‘potentially the greatest threat to EU security’. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure. While Libya has dismantled its WMD programme, Iran, and also North Korea, have yet to gain the trust of the international community. A likely revival of civil nuclear power in coming decades also poses challenges to the non-proliferation system, if not accompanied by the right safeguards.

The EU has been very active in multilateral fora, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation.

We should continue this approach, with political and financial action. A successful outcome to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, with a view in particular to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, is critical. We will endeavour to ensure that, in a balanced, effective, and concrete manner, this conference examines means to step up international efforts against proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to do so.

More work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Terrorism and Organised Crime

Terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat to our livelihoods. Attacks have taken place in Madrid and London, while others have been foiled, and home-grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent. Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering.

Since 2003, the EU has made progress in addressing both, with additional measures inside the Union, under the 2004 Hague Programme, and a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted in 2005. These have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, also from 2005, is based on respect for human rights and international law. It follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of an attack. While national action is central, appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator has been an important step forward at the European level.

Within the EU, we have done much to protect our societies against terrorism. We should tighten co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism materials, on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism. Further work on terrorist financing is required, along with an effective and comprehensive EU policy on information sharing, taking due account of protection of personal data.

We must also do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment, by addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination. Inter-cultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of Civilisations, has an important role.

On organised crime, existing partnerships within our neighbourhood and key partners, and within the UN, should be deepened, in addressing movement of people, police and judicial cooperation. Implementation of existing UN instruments on crime is essential. We should further strengthen our counter-terrorism partnership with the United States, including in the area of data sharing and protection. Also, we should strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood. The EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN.

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.
**Cyber security**

Modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the internet. The EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted in 2006 addresses internet-based crime. However, attacks against private or government IT systems in EU Member States have given this a new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon.

More work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international co-operation.

**Energy Security**

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in June 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as are good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

**Climate change**

In 2003, the ESS already identified the security implications of climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. In March 2008, the High Representative and Commission presented a report to the European Council which described climate change as a “threat multiplier”. Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible.
We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope. International co-operation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential.

II. BUILDING STABILITY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND

Within our continent, enlargement continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform.

With Turkey, negotiations started in 2005, and a number of chapters have been opened since. Progress in the Western Balkans has been continuous, if slow. Accession negotiations with Croatia are well advanced. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has obtained candidate status. Stabilisation and Association agreements have been signed with the other Western Balkan countries. Serbia is close to fulfilling all conditions for moving towards deeper relations with the EU. The EU continues to play a leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, despite progress, more is required from local political leaders to overcome blockage of reforms.

We are deploying EULEX, our largest civilian ESDP mission to date, in Kosovo and will continue substantial economic support. Throughout the region, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations are indispensable.

It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, supports this process. In the east, all eligible countries participate except Belarus, with whom we are now taking steps in this direction.

With Ukraine, we have gone further, with a far-reaching association agreement which is close to being finalised. We will soon start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a similar agreement. The Black Sea Synergy has been launched to complement EU bilateral policies in this region of particular importance for Europe.

New concerns have arisen over the so-called “frozen conflicts” in our eastern neighbourhood. The situation in Georgia, concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has escalated, leading to an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response, through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support. Our engagement will continue, with the EU leading the Geneva Process. A possible settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus, through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format, and the EU Border Assistance Mission.
The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working towards deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.

The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, co-operation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners. The EU is fully engaged in the Annapolis Process towards a two-state solution, and is contributing sustained financial and budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, and capacity-building, including through the deployment of judicial, police and border management experts on the ground. In Lebanon, Member States provide the backbone of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. On Iraq, the EU has supported the political process, reconstruction, and rule of law, including through the EUJUST LEX mission.

Since 2003, Iran has been a growing source of concern. The Iranian nuclear programme has been subject to successive resolutions in the UNSC and IAEA. Development of a nuclear military capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted. The EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure, together with the US, China, and Russia. The High Representative has delivered a far-reaching offer for Iran to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community. If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows. At the same time, we need to work with regional countries including the Gulf States to build regional security.

The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a long-term commitment to bring stability. EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mission, and the EU is engaged on governance and development at all levels. The EU Police Mission is being expanded. These efforts will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries: in particular Pakistan, but also India, Central Asia and Iran. Indeed, improved prospects for good relations between India and Pakistan in recent years have been a positive element in the strategic balance sheet.
Security and development nexus

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation. In many conflict or post-conflict zones, we have to address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict is essential.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.

Ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of conflict. There are increasing tensions over water and raw materials which require multilateral solutions. The Kimberley Process and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer an innovative model to address this problem.

Piracy

The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organised crime. It is also a result of state failure. The world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade. Piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue more pressing in recent months, and affected delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The EU has responded, including with ATALANTA, our first maritime ESDP mission, to deter piracy off the Somali coast, alongside countries affected and other international actors, including NATO.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster Munitions and Landmines

In 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition. In the context of its implementation, the EU supports the UN Programme of Action in this field. The EU will continue to develop activities to combat threats posed by illicit SALW.
The EU has given strong support to the concept of an international Arms Trade Treaty and has decided to support the process leading towards its adoption. The EU is also a major donor to anti-mine action. It has actively supported and promoted the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines worldwide. The Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreed at Dublin in May 2008, represents an important step forward in responding to the humanitarian problems caused by this type of munitions, which constitute a major concern for all EU Member States. The adoption of a protocol on this type of munitions in the UN framework involving all major military powers would be an important further step.

III. EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD

To respond to the changing security environment we need to be more effective - among ourselves, within our neighbourhood and around the world.

A. A more effective and capable Europe

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners. Our election monitoring missions, led by members of the European Parliament, also make an important contribution.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is increasingly in demand. Our Georgia mission has demonstrated what can be achieved when we act collectively with the necessary political will. But the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. We are developing this aspect of ESDP by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.
ANNEX 3

We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context.

For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. We need full interoperability between national contingents. In support of this, Member States have committed to draw up national strategies to make experts available, complemented by more deployable staff for mission support, including budgeting and procurement. The ways in which equipment is made available and procured should be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions.

For military missions, we must continue to strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so.

B. Greater engagement with our neighbourhood

The ENP has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration.

The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part.

The Eastern Partnership foresees a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbours, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU. The proposals cover a wide range of bilateral and multilateral areas of cooperation including energy security and mobility of people.

Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE, the US and Russia. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.
We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the Arab states. Here, as elsewhere, full engagement with the US will be key. In each case, a durable settlement must bring together all the regional players. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played an increasingly important role in the region, whereas this has not been the case with Iran. There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations.

C. Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective. The key partner for Europe in this and other areas is the US. Where we have worked together, the EU and US have been a formidable force for good in the world.

The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. The EU works closely in key theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, and has improved institutional links, in line with our joint 2007 EU-UN Declaration. We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.

We have substantially expanded our relationship with China. Ties to Canada and Japan are close and longstanding. Russia remains an important partner on global issues. There is still room to do more in our relationship with India. Relations with other partners, including Brazil, South Africa and, within Europe, Norway and Switzerland, have grown in significance since 2003.

The EU is working more closely with regional organisations, and in particular the African Union. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning. We have deepened links with our Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Elsewhere, the EU has developed engagement with ASEAN, over regional issues such as Burma, with SAARC, and Latin America. Our experience gives the EU a particular role in fostering regional integration. Where others seek to emulate us, in line with their particular circumstances, we should support them.
The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.

Key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO. The EU is leading negotiations for a new international agreement on the former, and must use all its levers to achieve an ambitious outcome at Copenhagen in 2009. We should continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, and maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights. We need to mould the IMF and other financial institutions to reflect modern realities. The G8 should be transformed. And we must continue our collective efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

These issues cross boundaries, touching as much on domestic as foreign policy. Indeed, they demonstrate how in the twenty-first century, more than ever, sovereignty entails responsibility. With respect to core human rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

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Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.
CONSORTIUM VERSION  

OF  

THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION  

SECTION 2  

PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY  

Article 42  
(ex Article 17 TEU)  

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and  
security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military  
assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention  
and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations  
Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member  
States.  

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common  
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting  
unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a  
decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.  

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the  
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain  
Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty  
Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security  
and defence policy established within that framework.  

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the  
implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by  
the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them  
available to the common security and defence policy.  

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the  
field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to  
as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to  
satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any  
measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall  
participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in  
evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Article 43

1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

Article 44

1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Article 45

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:

(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;

(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;

(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;

(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.

Article 46

1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.
3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.

The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.

The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.

6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only.
Remarks by
Javier Solana,
EU High Representative
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

"ESDP@10: What lessons for the future?"

organised by the Swedish Presidency, the EU Institute for Security Studies
and in collaboration with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Brussels, 28 July 2009
The European Security and Defence Policy has reached an important milestone in its development. This year marks its tenth anniversary. I am grateful to the Presidency, the EU Institute for Strategic Studies and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs for organising this conference. I am delighted to be opening it with Carl.

Drawing the lessons from our experience of the last decade is a valuable exercise. It should include the range of key issues that we need to consider in taking ESDP forward into its second decade – policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.

I will say a few words on these. But I would first like to reflect on how far we have come. Where I think we are now and where I think ESDP should go in the coming years.

The EU today plays a crucial role in bringing stability to different parts of the world. Over the past ten years ESDP has contributed to this through 22 missions in four continents. The EU has proved the credibility of its military capability on the ground in Africa, in Congo and Chad. And now is proving it everyday in the difficult waters off Somalia. A real international endeavour under EU lead. It has proved its unique civil-military capability in the Balkans; and demonstrated its relevance, and capacity for immediate action, when we deployed over 200 unarmed monitors to Georgia last year.

We have come a long way in developing ESDP as a tool enabling Europe to project itself through action in response to crises. ESDP is no longer an aspiration; it is a reality. The EU is a global actor with an important role in the management of global challenges. The world looks to us for this. The demands on us are increasing.

Development of ESDP’s crisis management capacity is crucial to contributing effectively to international peace and security. It is the missing link. EU foreign policy used to be about declarations. Now the EU puts people in large, visible numbers on the ground and takes risks for peace.

**Lessons for the Future**

I would like to highlight 6 lessons I think are key to the development of a strong ESDP for the future.

**Lesson 1:** The strength of ESDP derives from its consensual basis, which lends it moral and legal legitimacy. Missions undertaken in the framework of ESDP are not based on a single state’s interests. But on a collective concern for other peoples' problems.

**Lesson 2:** Nothing can be achieved without the means to do the job. The demands on us will not go away. Our ambitions are growing, not diminishing. However, there is a gap between our ambitions and the reality of our capabilities. This must be addressed. We have demonstrated with three recent missions - EUMM Georgia, EULEX Kosovo and EUNAVFOR Atalanta what we can achieve when the political will matches our ambitions.

In a world where we must be ready to engage in more complex and risky endeavours, it is essential that we have the personnel and capabilities – both civilian and military, and at the moment they are needed – to back up the political decisions.
Striving for greater European defence integration and cooperation is a part of this. Member States should continue to support the European Defence Agency (EDA) in its efforts to lead this process. In an uncertain world of fast-changing dynamics and threats, the more we do together the more efficient we are. And the stronger and safer Europe will be.

**Lesson 3:** The comprehensive approach underpinning ESDP is its value added. The logic underpinning ESDP – its distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management – was ahead of its time when conceived. That logic has proved its validity and has been adopted by others. It provides a sound basis on which to approach the coming ten years.

**Lesson 4:** Our ESDP actions have to be firmly anchored in political strategies. The solution is always political. Civil wars, inter-state conflicts; problems with energy, climate change or non-proliferation: all require a political deal which takes account of the interests and power of all involved. Power is not just military or financial muscle, legitimacy is much more important.

Our Member States each have a different history and geography. We must improve our ability to channel the richness of this diversity in support of our political engagement in other parts of the world. The strengths of one Member State must become a source of strength for the others and for EU action.

**Lesson 5:** Partnerships become more and more important every day. We can do much more than 10 years ago. But we cannot do it alone. Building partnerships is complex and time consuming. But it is the way to foster ESDP through strategic cooperation with Canada, Norway, Russia, Turkey or the US.

The same applies to partner organisations – the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the AU. The ‘either/or’ EU-NATO debate is outdated. The EU is not a military alliance and the added value of the broader EU/ESDP approach to security has been demonstrated. The key issue now is to develop a more flexible framework for working together.

**Lesson 6:** Adaptability is a key strength. The world is constantly in flux and to cope with this we need better analysis, more means and more capabilities. We must therefore remain adaptable in terms of our engagement.

But we must also remain consistent in terms of the pursuit and application of our principles: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – these core values will remain as fundamental in 2020 as they are today.

**What are the next steps?**

First, our primary responsibility is to make Europe function well, including our crisis management structures. And then to enhance our collective ability to handle global crises. Our institutions, decision-making processes and command structures must be flexible. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will give us new momentum in this direction and the potential to do more, and to act more cohesively and with greater flexibility.

Second, we need more capabilities for crisis management - mechanisms for rapid response, flexible and sufficient financing arrangements; and more sophisticated political analyses. All are within reach.

Third, EU foreign policy cannot function if it is only about Member States particular concerns. We need solidarity. Also in political terms. We should back a Member State if it has a particular
ANNEX 5

problem or need. But this is a two-way street. Individual solidarity with the common endeavour is key for projecting force, for making ESDP works.

Fourth, the time is ripe now to have a more sophisticated interaction with our partners - both countries and organisations. The cooperation has to adapt to the particular theatre, not the other way round.

Fifth and finally: Yes, we should be bolder. ESDP is about risks. And we should be ready to take on more. The only way to mature in crisis management.

Thank you very much.