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Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism

Katinka Quintelier UGent and Daniel MT Fessler (2012) BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY. 27(1). p.95-113
abstract
Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
journalArticle (original)
publication status
published
subject
keyword
RELIGIOSITY, PERCEPTION, CHILDREN, ETHICAL IDEOLOGIES, Tolerance, Normative ethics, Experimental ethics, Moral psychology, Moral relativism, RULES, BELIEF, CONVICTION, JUDGMENTS, TOLERANCE
journal title
BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
Biol. Philos.
volume
27
issue
1
pages
95 - 113
Web of Science type
Article
Web of Science id
000297360700005
JCR category
HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
JCR impact factor
1.101 (2012)
JCR rank
6/58 (2012)
JCR quartile
1 (2012)
ISSN
0169-3867
DOI
10.1007/s10539-011-9270-6
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
A1
copyright statement
I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher
id
1094211
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-1094211
date created
2011-01-05 00:23:41
date last changed
2017-10-31 09:42:00
@article{1094211,
  abstract     = {Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual{\textquoteright}s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers{\textquoteright} normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.},
  author       = {Quintelier, Katinka and Fessler, Daniel MT},
  issn         = {0169-3867},
  journal      = {BIOLOGY \& PHILOSOPHY},
  keyword      = {RELIGIOSITY,PERCEPTION,CHILDREN,ETHICAL IDEOLOGIES,Tolerance,Normative ethics,Experimental ethics,Moral psychology,Moral relativism,RULES,BELIEF,CONVICTION,JUDGMENTS,TOLERANCE},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {95--113},
  title        = {Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9270-6},
  volume       = {27},
  year         = {2012},
}

Chicago
Quintelier, Katinka, and Daniel MT Fessler. 2012. “Varying Versions of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of Normative Relativism.” Biology & Philosophy 27 (1): 95–113.
APA
Quintelier, Katinka, & Fessler, D. M. (2012). Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism. BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY, 27(1), 95–113.
Vancouver
1.
Quintelier K, Fessler DM. Varying versions of moral relativism: the philosophy and psychology of normative relativism. BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY. 2012;27(1):95–113.
MLA
Quintelier, Katinka, and Daniel MT Fessler. “Varying Versions of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of Normative Relativism.” BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY 27.1 (2012): 95–113. Print.