Ghent University Academic Bibliography

Advanced

Credibility of fiscal policies and independent fiscal bodies

Frank Naert UGent (2010)
abstract
In this paper we address the problem of credibility in fiscal policy. In many instances fiscal policy as conducted by governments is not perceived as credible. The targets set forward by government are often not met and usually the divergence is on the negative side. Taxes are overestimated and spending is underestimated, leading to a deficit bias and growing indebtedness of governments. To enhance the credibility of fiscal policy several schemes are put forward. Most frequently used are fiscal rules that replace discretionary decision making. Fiscal rules however are difficult to sanction and although they can improve the quality of fiscal policy, they do not guarantee sound fiscal policy. Therefore it is sometimes suggested to install fiscal councils on top of the fiscal rules. Fiscal councils with tasks in forecasting and assessing fiscal policy have been and are being introduced in more and more countries. Some economists want to go further however and propose to establish fiscal councils with independent powers to conduct fiscal policy within the borderlines that parliament lays down. In this paper these tendencies are analyzed.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
year
type
conference
publication status
unpublished
subject
keyword
fiscal rules, credibility, budget institutions, fiscal agencies
conference name
International Association of Schools and Institutions of Administration
conference location
Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia
conference start
2010-07-12
conference end
2010-07-17
language
English
UGent publication?
yes
classification
C3
copyright statement
I have retained and own the full copyright for this publication
id
1086232
handle
http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-1086232
date created
2010-12-10 19:37:16
date last changed
2016-12-19 15:34:54
@inproceedings{1086232,
  abstract     = {In this paper we address the problem of credibility in fiscal policy. In many instances fiscal policy as conducted by governments is not perceived as credible. The targets set forward by government are often not met and usually the divergence is on the negative side. Taxes are overestimated and spending is underestimated, leading to a deficit bias and growing indebtedness of governments. To enhance the credibility of fiscal policy several schemes are put forward. Most frequently used are fiscal rules that replace discretionary decision making. Fiscal rules however are difficult to sanction and although they can improve the quality of fiscal policy, they do not guarantee sound fiscal policy. Therefore it is sometimes suggested to install fiscal councils on top of the fiscal rules. Fiscal councils with tasks in forecasting and assessing fiscal policy have been and are being introduced in more and more countries. Some economists want to go further however and propose to establish fiscal councils with independent powers to conduct fiscal policy within the borderlines that parliament lays down. In this paper these tendencies are analyzed.},
  author       = {Naert, Frank},
  keyword      = {fiscal rules,credibility,budget institutions,fiscal agencies},
  language     = {eng},
  location     = {Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia},
  title        = {Credibility of fiscal policies and independent fiscal bodies},
  year         = {2010},
}

Chicago
Naert, Frank. 2010. “Credibility of Fiscal Policies and Independent Fiscal Bodies.” In .
APA
Naert, F. (2010). Credibility of fiscal policies and independent fiscal bodies. Presented at the International Association of Schools and Institutions of Administration.
Vancouver
1.
Naert F. Credibility of fiscal policies and independent fiscal bodies. 2010.
MLA
Naert, Frank. “Credibility of Fiscal Policies and Independent Fiscal Bodies.” 2010. Print.