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Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project

(2009) Philosophy of Science. 76(5). p.389-400
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Abstract
I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms.

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Citation

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:

MLA
Van Dyck, Maarten. “Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project.” Philosophy of Science 76.5 (2009): 389–400. Print.
APA
Van Dyck, M. (2009). Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. Philosophy of Science, 76(5), 389–400. Presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy-of-Science-Association.
Chicago author-date
Van Dyck, Maarten. 2009. “Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project.” Philosophy of Science 76 (5): 389–400.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Van Dyck, Maarten. 2009. “Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project.” Philosophy of Science 76 (5): 389–400.
Vancouver
1.
Van Dyck M. Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. Philosophy of Science. 2009;76(5):389–400.
IEEE
[1]
M. Van Dyck, “Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 389–400, 2009.
@article{1019750,
  abstract     = {I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms.},
  author       = {Van Dyck, Maarten},
  issn         = {0031-8248},
  journal      = {Philosophy of Science},
  language     = {eng},
  location     = {Pittsburgh, PA},
  number       = {5},
  pages        = {389--400},
  title        = {Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project},
  volume       = {76},
  year         = {2009},
}

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