@inproceedings{01KWHE5DA65MQNHJ3SFQ43Z2TN,
  abstract     = {{Mainstream news media have been brought to the forefront in efforts to understand the rise of (right-wing) populism in Europe as they may provide a fertile climate for populism to thrive (De Jonge 2019; 2021a; 2021b; Manucci, 2017, Mazzoleni, 2008; Krämer, 2018). At the same time, mainstream media are increasingly accused of bias within right-wing anti-media populistic communication (Engesser et al., 2017; Strömbäck & Åkerlund, 2025). Other authors point to the apparent dominance of an anti-populist discourse in mediated public debate (Goyvaerts & De Cleen, 2020; Shchinova et al., 2024). 
Empirical studies typically tend to focus on populism, anti-media populism or anti-populism separately, whether in political communication or news discourse (e.g.  De Mulder & Paulussen, 2021; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2020). Holistic research into the frequency and patterns of the interplay of populism, anti-media populism and anti-populism in news related content remains limited. Despite its importance for fully understanding the populism-media nexus, as these phenomena don’t exist in vacuum but are in constant interaction (cf. Voutyras, 2024). In Europe, populism-media research has predominantly focused on political party broadcasts, social media or established newspaper reporting (E.g. Engesser et al, 2017; Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2020; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), while talk shows remain understudied, especially in Flanders. Yet talk shows are particularly relevant due to their live format, the journalist-politician interaction, limited editorial control, which might make them particularly suitable for populist communication (Blassnig et al., 2018; Bos & Brants, 2014; Ernst et al., 2019). This leads to the research question: How do populism and anti-populism manifest in Flemish talk shows?

Flanders, the Dutch-speaking northern region of Belgium, has known early breakthrough of radical-right wing populist parties. Over time, increasing media attention and accommodation, likely facilitated their growth (De Jonge, 2021a; 2021b; Schafraad et al., 2012). Flanders does not enforce a strict cordon médiatique, allowing journalists for varied strategies in dealing with populist actors and themes (De Jonge, 2021b; De Jonge & Gaufman, 2022). This makes it a compelling case for analysis. Some strategies, like confrontation, may inadvertently reinforce populist claims of media bias (Esser et al., 2017; Krämer, 2018). 
Through a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of three Flemish current affairs talk shows, this study therefore aims to shed light on (1) the prevalence of populist, anti-media populist, and anti-populist communication, and (2) the roles of diverse actors herein, and (3) how the populism-anti-media populism interplay manifests. The sample consists of 60 episodes—20 each from direct competitors De Tafel van Gert (commercial broadcaster), Bar Goens (commercial broadcaster) and De Afspraak (public broadcaster)—aired between 28 April and 29 May 2025. To guide deductive coding, a literature-based framework was developed, distinguishing four modes of populism–media interaction: (1) Populism through media, (2) populism by media, (3) anti-media populism (4) anti-populism. Data coding and analysis are planned between November 2025 and February 2026. Findings will advance a more comprehensive and ecologically valid understanding of how populism and anti-populism manifest within the media–populism nexus.}},
  author       = {{Renne, Lonnie and Lamot, Kenza and Van Leuven, Sarah}},
  booktitle    = {{ECREA Journalism Studies Section Conference 2026, Abstracts}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  location     = {{Groningen, the Netherlands}},
  title        = {{The manifestation of populism and anti-populism in Flemish current affairs talk shows : a quantitative and qualitative content analysis}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}