@article{01JDKS9DW2WRDQGQ9FP79F5419,
  abstract     = {{In equity crowdfunding (ECF), early investments serve as signals of venture potential to prospective investors, making them more likely to join an offering. We argue that ECF platform team members can exploit this mechanism and convey false signals to unsophisticated investors. Data from a prominent ECF platform indicate that platform team members "invest" in ventures that exhibit weaker post-campaign outcomes. However, in ventures that successfully fundraise, platform team members typically withdraw their investment (after it incentivized others to join), and these ventures show even weaker post-campaign outcomes. Finally, ventures' post-campaign outcomes are particularly weak when this "invest-and-withdraw" tactic is executed by the platform's upper echelons, whose investments can further be perceived as endorsement signals by the crowd, despite significant goal incongruence between the upper echelons and the crowd. Our study presents novel theoretical and empirical insights into the signaling, financial misconduct, and ECF literature, and holds important policy implications. Executive summary: Past research has shown that equity crowdfunding (ECF) platforms can reduce agency problems between entrepreneurs and ECF investors, such as adverse selection problems, by providing selection and due diligence activities. In other words, past research has focused on the bright side of ECF platforms. However, this study focuses on a possible dark side of ECF platforms. The paper investigates the practice of ECF platform team members fabricating support (i.e., using an invest-and-withdraw tactic) towards firms with weaker prospects listed on their own platform. ECF platform team members can use an invest-and-withdraw tactic in firms with weaker prospects. Indeed, through their investments, ECF platform team members influence early investments, which are often used by prospective ECF investors as a quality signal to influence their own investment decisions. However, platform team members then withdraw their investments (after their investment lured follow-on investors to the offering). As such, platform team members}},
  articleno    = {{106457}},
  author       = {{Mataigne, Virginie and Meoli, Michele and Vanacker, Tom and Vismara, Silvio}},
  issn         = {{0883-9026}},
  journal      = {{JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING}},
  keywords     = {{Equity crowdfunding,Misconduct,Information cascades,Platforms,Digital finance,Entrepreneurial finance,CAPITAL FIRMS,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,AGENCY THEORY,INVESTMENT,ENTREPRENEURSHIP,MANAGEMENT,PERFORMANCE,OWNERSHIP,INVESTORS,SELECTION}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{24}},
  title        = {{False signaling by platform team members and post-campaign venture outcomes : evidence from an equity crowdfunding platform}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2024.106457}},
  volume       = {{40}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

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