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Hometown bias in Flanders : the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on the distribution of conditional grants (2004–2017)

Carine Smolders (UGent) and Benjamin Descamps (UGent)
(2025) REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES. 35(5). p.859-886
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Abstract
Are grants strategically allocated to towns where ministers live? This question is investigated using panel data covering four legislative periods and 293 Flemish municipalities. The findings provide clear evidence of hometown bias. Ministerial careers related to local embeddedness explain differences in received conditional grants. Ministers, who were once mayors, started their careers locally or predominantly developed upper-level careers to bring more resources to their hometowns. Conversely, ministers, recruited from outside politics, do not generate extra resources. During local election years, ministers in key positions on local lists (leader or pusher) also secure significantly more funding. Investigating grants during federal, regional, and local election years consistently reveals significant hometown bias. This trend persists across various ministerial career trajectories, particularly for ministers who began their careers locally or served as mayors, highlighting the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on grant distribution.
Keywords
Pork barrel politics, Political career paths, Hometown bias, Political ambition theory, Intergovernmental grants, Fiscal federalism, POLITICAL CAREERS, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CENTRALIZED PROVISION, FAVORITISM, REDISTRIBUTION, ALLOCATION, IDEOLOGY, PATTERNS, CONSEQUENCES, EFFICIENCY

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Citation

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MLA
Smolders, Carine, and Benjamin Descamps. “Hometown Bias in Flanders : The Impact of Ministerial Local Embeddedness on the Distribution of Conditional Grants (2004–2017).” REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES, vol. 35, no. 5, 2025, pp. 859–86, doi:10.1080/13597566.2024.2374902.
APA
Smolders, C., & Descamps, B. (2025). Hometown bias in Flanders : the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on the distribution of conditional grants (2004–2017). REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES, 35(5), 859–886. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2024.2374902
Chicago author-date
Smolders, Carine, and Benjamin Descamps. 2025. “Hometown Bias in Flanders : The Impact of Ministerial Local Embeddedness on the Distribution of Conditional Grants (2004–2017).” REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 35 (5): 859–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2024.2374902.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Smolders, Carine, and Benjamin Descamps. 2025. “Hometown Bias in Flanders : The Impact of Ministerial Local Embeddedness on the Distribution of Conditional Grants (2004–2017).” REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 35 (5): 859–886. doi:10.1080/13597566.2024.2374902.
Vancouver
1.
Smolders C, Descamps B. Hometown bias in Flanders : the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on the distribution of conditional grants (2004–2017). REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES. 2025;35(5):859–86.
IEEE
[1]
C. Smolders and B. Descamps, “Hometown bias in Flanders : the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on the distribution of conditional grants (2004–2017),” REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 859–886, 2025.
@article{01J2JTKD339GM1703SNKTK4FFQ,
  abstract     = {{Are grants strategically allocated to towns where ministers live? This question is investigated using panel data covering four legislative periods and 293 Flemish municipalities. The findings provide clear evidence of hometown bias. Ministerial careers related to local embeddedness explain differences in received conditional grants. Ministers, who were once mayors, started their careers locally or predominantly developed upper-level careers to bring more resources to their hometowns. Conversely, ministers, recruited from outside politics, do not generate extra resources. During local election years, ministers in key positions on local lists (leader or pusher) also secure significantly more funding. Investigating grants during federal, regional, and local election years consistently reveals significant hometown bias. This trend persists across various ministerial career trajectories, particularly for ministers who began their careers locally or served as mayors, highlighting the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on grant distribution.}},
  author       = {{Smolders, Carine and Descamps, Benjamin}},
  issn         = {{1359-7566}},
  journal      = {{REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES}},
  keywords     = {{Pork barrel politics,Political career paths,Hometown bias,Political ambition theory,Intergovernmental grants,Fiscal federalism,POLITICAL CAREERS,PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION,CENTRALIZED PROVISION,FAVORITISM,REDISTRIBUTION,ALLOCATION,IDEOLOGY,PATTERNS,CONSEQUENCES,EFFICIENCY}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{859--886}},
  title        = {{Hometown bias in Flanders : the impact of ministerial local embeddedness on the distribution of conditional grants (2004–2017)}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2024.2374902}},
  volume       = {{35}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}
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