@article{01HR4JBKBEG421FGDEY3483Q53,
  abstract     = {{We argue that two well-known examples (strawberry distribution and Konigsberg bridges) generally considered genuine cases of distinctively mathematical explanation can also be understood as cases of distinctively generic explanation. The latter answer resemblance questions (e.g., why did neither person A nor B manage to cross all bridges) by appealing to 'generic task laws' instead of mathematical necessity (as is done in distinctively mathematical explanations). We submit that distinctively generic explanations derive their explanatory force from their role in ontological unification. Additionally, we argue that distinctively generic explanations are better seen as standardly mathematical instead of distinctively mathematical. Finally, we compare and contrast our proposal with the work of Christopher Pincock on abstract explanations in science and the views of Michael Strevens on abstract causal event explanations.}},
  articleno    = {{102}},
  author       = {{Weber, Erik and Gonzalez Barman, Kristian and De Coninck, Thijs}},
  issn         = {{0039-7857}},
  journal      = {{SYNTHESE}},
  keywords     = {{Abstract explanation,Inferential conception of applied mathematics,Konigsberg bridges,Non-causal explanation,Ontological unification,UNIFICATION,DIRECTIONALITY}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{30}},
  title        = {{Distinctively generic explanations of physical facts}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04486-2}},
  volume       = {{203}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}

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