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A three-legged race : assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006)

Maxime Vandenberghe (UGent)
(2025) ACTA POLITICA. 60(2). p.385-408
Author
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Abstract
Consociational democracy is a well-known recipe for managing divided societies, but critics have questioned the functionality of the power-sharing it prescribes. When different segments are forced to cooperate in a context of vetoes, elite cooperation and joint decision-making might be hard to achieve. But what does decision-making in power-sharing arrangements look like in practice? This study sheds light on the real-life functionality of consociational power-sharing as measured through the outcomes of conflicts (N = 328) in fifteen power-sharing cabinets in Belgium (1979-2006). Specifically, it assessess (1) how politicians (fail to) resolve conflicts, (2) how this evolved against the background of decentralization, and (3) whether ethno-territorial conflict-resolution is harder than non-ethno-territorial conflict-resolution. Different dimensions of functionality are discerned. The results provide a counterintuitive but nuanced view on power-sharing functionality, showing (1) that dysfunctionality levels vary depending on the indicator, (2) that power-sharing is not increasingly dysfunctional throughout time, and (3) that ethno-territorial conflict-resolution is not harder. The analyses add to contemporary debates on coalition politics, the paradox of federalism, and ethno-territorial politics.
Keywords
Consociational democracy, Ethno-territorial conflict, Decentralization, Belgium, COALITION AGREEMENTS, NORTHERN-IRELAND, POLITICS, MANAGEMENT, DEMOCRACY, MODEL

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MLA
Vandenberghe, Maxime. “A Three-Legged Race : Assessing the Functionality of Consociational Power-Sharing with Cabinet Conflict-Resolution Data from Belgium (1979–2006).” ACTA POLITICA, vol. 60, no. 2, 2025, pp. 385–408, doi:10.1057/s41269-023-00328-0.
APA
Vandenberghe, M. (2025). A three-legged race : assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006). ACTA POLITICA, 60(2), 385–408. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-023-00328-0
Chicago author-date
Vandenberghe, Maxime. 2025. “A Three-Legged Race : Assessing the Functionality of Consociational Power-Sharing with Cabinet Conflict-Resolution Data from Belgium (1979–2006).” ACTA POLITICA 60 (2): 385–408. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-023-00328-0.
Chicago author-date (all authors)
Vandenberghe, Maxime. 2025. “A Three-Legged Race : Assessing the Functionality of Consociational Power-Sharing with Cabinet Conflict-Resolution Data from Belgium (1979–2006).” ACTA POLITICA 60 (2): 385–408. doi:10.1057/s41269-023-00328-0.
Vancouver
1.
Vandenberghe M. A three-legged race : assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006). ACTA POLITICA. 2025;60(2):385–408.
IEEE
[1]
M. Vandenberghe, “A three-legged race : assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006),” ACTA POLITICA, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 385–408, 2025.
@article{01HNZR8A4J7VB8V60Q8JFXA9KV,
  abstract     = {{Consociational democracy is a well-known recipe for managing divided societies, but critics have questioned the functionality of the power-sharing it prescribes. When different segments are forced to cooperate in a context of vetoes, elite cooperation and joint decision-making might be hard to achieve. But what does decision-making in power-sharing arrangements look like in practice? This study sheds light on the real-life functionality of consociational power-sharing as measured through the outcomes of conflicts (N = 328) in fifteen power-sharing cabinets in Belgium (1979-2006). Specifically, it assessess (1) how politicians (fail to) resolve conflicts, (2) how this evolved against the background of decentralization, and (3) whether ethno-territorial conflict-resolution is harder than non-ethno-territorial conflict-resolution. Different dimensions of functionality are discerned. The results provide a counterintuitive but nuanced view on power-sharing functionality, showing (1) that dysfunctionality levels vary depending on the indicator, (2) that power-sharing is not increasingly dysfunctional throughout time, and (3) that ethno-territorial conflict-resolution is not harder. The analyses add to contemporary debates on coalition politics, the paradox of federalism, and ethno-territorial politics.}},
  author       = {{Vandenberghe, Maxime}},
  issn         = {{0001-6810}},
  journal      = {{ACTA POLITICA}},
  keywords     = {{Consociational democracy,Ethno-territorial conflict,Decentralization,Belgium,COALITION AGREEMENTS,NORTHERN-IRELAND,POLITICS,MANAGEMENT,DEMOCRACY,MODEL}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{385--408}},
  title        = {{A three-legged race : assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006)}},
  url          = {{http://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-023-00328-0}},
  volume       = {{60}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}
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