Constructing leniency policies : economic effects and implications of granting leniency in cartel cases
(2023)
- Author
- Ruben Korsten (UGent)
- Promoter
- Ben Depoorter (UGent)
- Organization
- Abstract
- The dissertation delves into leniency policies in antitrust enforcement, which incentivize cartel members to reveal wrongdoing in exchange for reduced penalties. While these policies are effective in detection and deterrence, relying solely on them can yield suboptimal outcomes. The dissertation underscores optimizing policy design based on factors such as collusion, transaction, and information costs. Notably, it highlights the need for both independent investigations by the antitrust authority and self-reporting and addressing practical challenges such as parallel proceedings and access to leniency documents. In this context, international cooperation is found to be crucial for combating international cartels. From a welfare perspective, the dissertation underscores limiting transaction costs and welfare losses from hiding by cartel members and finds that confidential disclosure policies can be welfare-maximizing.
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Citation
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication: http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-01HHZ964QP0ZY88202TG7ZM1XP
- MLA
- Korsten, Ruben. Constructing Leniency Policies : Economic Effects and Implications of Granting Leniency in Cartel Cases. Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology, 2023.
- APA
- Korsten, R. (2023). Constructing leniency policies : economic effects and implications of granting leniency in cartel cases. Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology, Ghent, Belgium.
- Chicago author-date
- Korsten, Ruben. 2023. “Constructing Leniency Policies : Economic Effects and Implications of Granting Leniency in Cartel Cases.” Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology.
- Chicago author-date (all authors)
- Korsten, Ruben. 2023. “Constructing Leniency Policies : Economic Effects and Implications of Granting Leniency in Cartel Cases.” Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology.
- Vancouver
- 1.Korsten R. Constructing leniency policies : economic effects and implications of granting leniency in cartel cases. [Ghent, Belgium]: Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology; 2023.
- IEEE
- [1]R. Korsten, “Constructing leniency policies : economic effects and implications of granting leniency in cartel cases,” Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology, Ghent, Belgium, 2023.
@phdthesis{01HHZ964QP0ZY88202TG7ZM1XP,
abstract = {{The dissertation delves into leniency policies in antitrust enforcement, which incentivize cartel members to reveal wrongdoing in exchange for reduced penalties. While these policies are effective in detection and deterrence, relying solely on them can yield suboptimal outcomes. The dissertation underscores optimizing policy design based on factors such as collusion, transaction, and information costs. Notably, it highlights the need for both independent investigations by the antitrust authority and self-reporting and addressing practical challenges such as parallel proceedings and access to leniency documents. In this context, international cooperation is found to be crucial for combating international cartels. From a welfare perspective, the dissertation underscores limiting transaction costs and welfare losses from hiding by cartel members and finds that confidential disclosure policies can be welfare-maximizing.}},
author = {{Korsten, Ruben}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{172}},
publisher = {{Ghent University. Faculty of Law and Criminology}},
school = {{Ghent University}},
title = {{Constructing leniency policies : economic effects and implications of granting leniency in cartel cases}},
year = {{2023}},
}