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<title>The manifestation of populism and anti-populism in Flemish current affairs talk shows : a quantitative and qualitative content analysis</title>
<link>https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/01KWHE5DA65MQNHJ3SFQ43Z2TN</link>
<dc:creator>Renne, Lonnie</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Lamot, Kenza</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Van Leuven, Sarah</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026</dc:date>
<dc:description>Mainstream news media have been brought to the forefront in efforts to understand the rise of (right-wing) populism in Europe as they may provide a fertile climate for populism to thrive (De Jonge 2019; 2021a; 2021b; Manucci, 2017, Mazzoleni, 2008; Kr&#xE4;mer, 2018). At the same time, mainstream media are increasingly accused of bias within right-wing anti-media populistic communication (Engesser et al., 2017; Str&#xF6;mb&#xE4;ck &#x26; &#xC5;kerlund, 2025). Other authors point to the apparent dominance of an anti-populist discourse in mediated public debate (Goyvaerts &#x26; De Cleen, 2020; Shchinova et al., 2024). 
Empirical studies typically tend to focus on populism, anti-media populism or anti-populism separately, whether in political communication or news discourse (e.g.  De Mulder &#x26; Paulussen, 2021; Jagers &#x26; Walgrave, 2007; Hameleers &#x26; Vliegenthart, 2020). Holistic research into the frequency and patterns of the interplay of populism, anti-media populism and anti-populism in news related content remains limited. Despite its importance for fully understanding the populism-media nexus, as these phenomena don&#x2019;t exist in vacuum but are in constant interaction (cf. Voutyras, 2024). In Europe, populism-media research has predominantly focused on political party broadcasts, social media or established newspaper reporting (E.g. Engesser et al, 2017; Hameleers &#x26; Vliegenthart, 2020; Jagers &#x26; Walgrave, 2007), while talk shows remain understudied, especially in Flanders. Yet talk shows are particularly relevant due to their live format, the journalist-politician interaction, limited editorial control, which might make them particularly suitable for populist communication (Blassnig et al., 2018; Bos &#x26; Brants, 2014; Ernst et al., 2019). This leads to the research question: How do populism and anti-populism manifest in Flemish talk shows?

Flanders, the Dutch-speaking northern region of Belgium, has known early breakthrough of radical-right wing populist parties. Over time, increasing media attention and accommodation, likely facilitated their growth (De Jonge, 2021a; 2021b; Schafraad et al., 2012). Flanders does not enforce a strict cordon m&#xE9;diatique, allowing journalists for varied strategies in dealing with populist actors and themes (De Jonge, 2021b; De Jonge &#x26; Gaufman, 2022). This makes it a compelling case for analysis. Some strategies, like confrontation, may inadvertently reinforce populist claims of media bias (Esser et al., 2017; Kr&#xE4;mer, 2018). 
Through a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of three Flemish current affairs talk shows, this study therefore aims to shed light on (1) the prevalence of populist, anti-media populist, and anti-populist communication, and (2) the roles of diverse actors herein, and (3) how the populism-anti-media populism interplay manifests. The sample consists of 60 episodes&#x2014;20 each from direct competitors De Tafel van Gert (commercial broadcaster), Bar Goens (commercial broadcaster) and De Afspraak (public broadcaster)&#x2014;aired between 28 April and 29 May 2025. To guide deductive coding, a literature-based framework was developed, distinguishing four modes of populism&#x2013;media interaction: (1) Populism through media, (2) populism by media, (3) anti-media populism (4) anti-populism. Data coding and analysis are planned between November 2025 and February 2026. Findings will advance a more comprehensive and ecologically valid understanding of how populism and anti-populism manifest within the media&#x2013;populism nexus.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/01KWHE5DA65MQNHJ3SFQ43Z2TN</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-01KWHE5DA65MQNHJ3SFQ43Z2TN</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:source>ECREA Journalism Studies Section Conference 2026, Abstracts</dc:source>
<dc:subject>Social Sciences</dc:subject>
<dc:title>The manifestation of populism and anti-populism in Flemish current affairs talk shows : a quantitative and qualitative content analysis</dc:title>
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